Children of Bolivar and Garvey

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CONTEXT

We meet in the scenic and historic peninsular of the Yucatan, cradle of the Maya civilisation, which 1,100 years ago dazzled Mesoamerica with its brilliant achievements in architecture and construction, in mathematics and writing, in jewellery and pottery. Today, that peninsular lies at the Northwest corner of the region that we have adopted as our frame of reference and of concern.

That region is itself part of a wider world, a world of momentous change. A world in which technology - especially the Internet - has virtually eliminated the significance of physical distance in communication. A world where a supranational economic authority in the form of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has come into existence. A new new round of negotiations in the WTO is scheduled to begin next month.

It is a world where the continued relevance and viability of the nation-state is being questioned, especially for small and vulnerable states such as ours. A world in which global climate change is exposing our countries to natural disasters of growing frequency and intensity. Where globally, there is persistent poverty and growing inequality. And it is a world where violent conflict continues to erupt, both within and between nations.

GLOBALISATION

Perhaps most significant of all, it is a world of growing scepticism and unease about the alleged benefits of globalisation. Increasingly the question is being posed: globalisation perhaps, but by what means and to what end?

This year's Human Development Report from the UNDP is symptomatic—its theme is "Globalisation with a Human Face". The report is highly critical of globalisation that is driven by exclusively by needs of the market and the search for private profit. Some telling examples provided are:

The combined wealth of the top three billionaires of the world exceeds the annual per capita income of the 600 million people in the least developed countries.

The concentration of wealth is growing, as the world's 200 richest people more than doubled their net worth in the four years to 1998, while the incomes of the poorest people in the world hardly grew at all.

The income gap between the fifth of mankind living in the world's richest countries and the fifth living in the poorest countries, was 74 to 1 in 1997, an increase from 60 to 1 in 1990 and from 30 to 1 in 1960.

Nearly one-quarter of the 4.5 billion people in the developing world still do not have access to some of life's most basic choices—survival beyond age 40, access to

knowledge and minimum private and public services. 1.3 billion people in the world have less than the equivalent of $1 a day.
The Report argues persuasively that the global market needs to be subject to the rules of humane national and international governance, so that in the interests of human rights, equity, social inclusion, human security, sustainability, and development may be better served.
This is the context of the emergence of civil society as active players in international advocacy. Recent examples of this are the campaign on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), the Jubilee Campaign for Debt Relief for the world's poorest countries, the "50 Years is enough" campaign relating to the World Bank and the IMF, the campaign related to genetically modified foods, and the campaign targeted at the new round of WTO negotiations.
The tasks before civil society organisations of the Greater Caribbean will be conditioned by these global developments, mediated by the specific realities of our own situation, and guided by the interests of the people and the communities at the base of our societies.

DIVERSITY

In my remarks today I wish to address the specific realities of our own situation, drawing attention to the diversity of our region as well to shared characteristics.
In speaking of our diversity, I do not wish to be misunderstood. My intent is not to promote divisiveness, but understanding. In my work on regional co-operation over the years I have become aware of the degree to which successful co-operation is dependent on mutual understanding. This means recognising the diversity of experience and perspective as the basis for the negotiation of differences and the development of trust.

MILLENNIUM

It might be useful to take as our point of departure the up-coming millennium celebrations, and to pose the questions: what is being celebrated? By whom? And why? And what, if anything, does this event mean for us?
It is often overlooked that the significance of the event derives from the Christian calendar, itself a Western invention. It is an interesting thought that if the coming of the second millennium *Anno Domini* 1000 years ago was marked at all, it would only have been celebrated by a minority of the human population—the part living in the Mediterranean and western Europe that was subject to the influence of the Roman church. It certainly had no significance to the Mayas, whose calendar is now recognised to be as accurate—or more so—as the one that we currently use!
The globalisation of the Christian calendar during the course of the second millennium AD was but one expression of the rise of the West to a position of global dominance. This rise was probably the single most influential development in human society over this period of time.
Closely allied to this were two other developments of far-reaching importance .One was the emergence of capitalism and its spread to all corners of the world as the dominant form of organisation of human activity. The other was a scientific and technological

revolution which, far from being a single event, has become a permanent feature of our existence.
This is what the Euro-centred world, will, in essence, be celebrating: its emergence from the Dark Ages, its mastery over the material world and its assumption of a global mission.
We, who have been far more the objects than the subjects of the history of the second millennium, may be forgiven if we view it from a somewhat different optic. We will recall that these developments were associated with the conquest of America and the subsequent deaths of tens of millions of the native population, with the rise of commercial capitalism and the resultant traffic in millions of human bodies from the African continent over three centuries, with the colonial division of Africa and much of Asia in the 19th century, and with the more recent history of indentureship and immigration.
It is this experience that has left us a legacy of diversity: in politics and language, in ethnicity and culture, in economic and social development. The broad picture is one where, although our region has been a major participant in, and contributor to, the rise of the West over the past 500 years, many if not most of its people have yet to enjoy the fruits of the enormous material and technological advances that have occurred.

LANGUAGE

Differences of language are the aspect of our diversity that we probably feel the most. There are at least six official languages—Spanish, English, French, Dutch, Haitian Creole and the Papiamento of the Netherlands Antilles. Although Spanish is by far the majority language in terms of population, two-thirds of the 37 political entities in the Caribbean basin are non-Spanish speaking.
Language goes beyond simple communication—it is a carrier of culture and of embedded worldview. As a result, Caribbean populations have tended to internalise the preconceptions and the prejudices of the linguistic zone to which it was attached, complicating the matter of establishing understanding and trust across linguistic zones.
For example, in the colonial Jamaica in which I grew up we were taught that Spanish speakers were loquacious, temperamental, and argumentative. Latin American societies were generally thought to have an innate propensity to adopt military rule, in contrast to the "democratic" Anglo-Saxon political culture. These are typically Anglo-Saxon stereotypes which carry innate assumptions about the superiority of English-based cultures over others. They were transmitted to us, the colonial subjects, through the colonial educational system—the same system that taught us about the "backwardness" of the African and Asian cultures from which our ancestors had been "rescued".
I imagine that there analogous "counter-stereotypes" held about we English speakers by Spanish, French and Dutch speakers.
One curious result of this is that the most educated people are often those in which cultural prejudices are strongest. This contrasts with the rather down-to-earth attitudes of ordinary people who pick up foreign languages as part of their toolkit of survival skills.
I was recently in the island of St Maarten, which is half French and half-Dutch and which has a large population of English-speaking Caribbeans coming from neighbouring islands. My host told me that his own mother never went to school but speaks more

language than he does—Spanish, because she was born in the Dominican Republic; French, because she lives on the French side of the island; Papamiento and Dutch, because she does business frequently on the Dutch side; and English because, he says, "Its her native language".
So that the experiences of the ordinary people of the region--migrant workers and petty traders and others like them—suggest that language is not an insuperable barrier to regional co-operation.

ETHNICITY AND CULTURE

Let me now turn to the ethnic and cultural dimension. From this perspective the Greater Caribbean is probably one of the most diverse regions size in the world. The basic streams include the native American or Amerindian, European—mainly Hispanic, African, Asian—mainly East Indian, together giving rise to a range of Mestizo or Creole cultures of varying degrees of integration.
We need to remember that each ethnic group brought its own cultural baggage and participated in the colonial and postcolonial labour process in a particular way, and hence developed a perspective that has both features in common with that of the others and features that are unique to its own experience.
Coming from Jamaica, the African-Caribbean experience is obviously the one with which I am most familiar. What was special about this was that the form of chattel slavery to which the African was subjected was aimed at systematically stripping him of his native language and customs. The idea was to minimise the risk of resistance and rebellion and to secure a compliant labour force.
On the slave plantations of the West Indies to use an African tongue or practice an African religion was a crime which attracted severe physical punishment or worse. The denigration of things African extended to the details of physical features including the colour of the skin and the characteristics of mouth, nose and hair. In Jamaica and other Caribbean islands we still speak of "good" hair and "bad" hair and other characteristics measured along the scale of the desired European ideal.
Even now, it is very difficult for a phenotypically black woman to win the Miss Jamaica beauty contest, despite the fact that the population is 80 percent phenotypically black and 98 percent of African origin. I imagine that there are analogous situations in the other countries where there are large populations of non-European origin but yet the Nordic ideal of beauty rules supreme.
After slavery was formally abolished in the 19th century the myth of black inferiority was maintained and the African-Caribbean person was subjected to various forms of discrimination and institutionalised racism. This was the case in all New World societies with a significant population of African origin whether Hispanic, Anglophone, Francophone or Dutch.
The result of this historical experience is that for Caribbean people of African descent ethnicity is central to identity—that is, to how they perceive themselves and are perceived by others. Hence, ethnicity often supercedes nationality in defining identity.
A case in point is the appeal of the Garvey movement in many parts of the Greater Caribbean during early 20th century. Marcus Garvey was a Black Jamaican who organised the Universal Negro Improvement Association in the 1910s and 1920s. The

UNIA was devoted to black self-awareness and improvement, the elimination of racial discrimination against blacks and the liberation of the African continent from colonial rule.

Besides the British islands and the United States, the Garvey movement developed a following in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela and Cuba—most of which Garvey visited personally. Today, Garveyism remains a strong current of counter-hegemonic ideology in the black Diaspora. At the popular level it finds its expression in the appeal of the Rastafari movement and the popularity of its trade mark, the "dreadlocks" hair style; and in reggae music—at least in its original versions—and the universal appeal of its icon, the Jamaican artist and poet Bob Marley. At the intellectual and political levels it is represented by the various currents of Pan-Africanism throughout most of the 20th century.

I am curious to know how far Garveyism has a counterpart in Pan-Aboriginal Indian movements within the region and hemisphere. I note for example, the Declaration of Patzcuaro of May 1999 signed by 26 different Indian peoples from South, Central and North America, calling for solidarity and respect for their rights (published in *Archipielago* March-June 1999).

I contast this current of reactive ethnic nationalism with the tradition of multi-ethnic Pan-Americanism of Hispanic Creole origin, represented most clearly by the great Latin American revolutionaries, Simon Bolivar and Jose Marti. Two recent experiences brought this home to me in somewhat striking fashion.

The first of these occurred during an International Meeting on Globalization in Havana in January of this year. A speaker from Argentina had proposed a union of South American states in alliance with the European Union to counter the influence of the United States. President Castro took the floor. He insisted that Latin American integration could not involve South America only and must include Central and the Caribbean islands. He spoke with great feeling about the plight of the small island states of the English-speaking Caribbean and I noted with satisfaction his declaration "The Caribbean people of African descent are part of Our America. We see their faces in the faces of our own Cuban people who were brought here as slaves".

His remarks drew strong applause from the large audience, which consisted largely of Hispanic Americans. This conception of Latin America, which could be labelled *Bolivariano* and *Martiano* was resonated in remarks made by President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela during the course of a recent visit to Jamaica. President Chavez spoke about Bolivar and Garvey, the national heroes of the two countries respectively and of the different ethnic groups that make up the Latin American family. By way of illustration he remarked "If I were to wear a wig with a plait down my back I would be an Indian. If I grew my hair long I would be a Negro. And I am also white, so I am a true Latin American".

It struck me that President Chavez was, at one and the same time, pointing to the ethnic bonds between the two countries while articulating the Bolivarian vision of Latin America as a multi-ethnic community of the dispossessed.

How far will it be possible to reconcile the Pan-Americanism of Bolivar and Marti with Pan-Africanism and pan-Aboriginal American currents? This is a complicated matter to which there is no easy answer. What is imporant is for us to discuss the differences in perspective openly, in an atmosphere of tolerance and mutual respect and with the

objective of finding common ground. In a sense we have no choice, for we share a common geo-economic space and our interests are increasingly being brought together by the pressures of economic globalisation.

SIZE

Let us turn to one aspect of diversity that is often overlooked, that of size. It is quite remarkable that there are 22 political entities in the Caribbean with less than 1 million people, 11 of which are independent states (Table 1). All of these are in the insular Caribbean including the CARICOM members on the mainland.

At the other extreme is Mexico, which with 90 million has 42 percent of the population of the entire Caribbean basin. Colombia with 36 million has more people than in the Isthmus states and about the same as that of all the islands put together. Venezuela's 22 million is more than three times the population of the 14 members of CARICOM.

In between these two extremes there is a group of 12 countries, mainly the Isthmus states and the islands of the Greater Antilles, with populations in the range of 1-11 million.

Small size connotes greater vulnerability, particularly to natural disasters and to external shocks. After Hurricanes Mitch, Hugo, Gilbert and the Soufriere Hills Volcano in Montserrat, this point does not need to be labored.

Vulnerability is one of the most outstanding shared characteristics of the Central American states with the Caribbean islands. It is impossible to understand the depth of feeling of the small island states of the Eastern Caribbean on the treatment of their banana exports to the European Union without reference to this vulnerability. The plain fact is that the economies of Dominica, St Vincent and St Lucia will be devastated if and when they are forced to compete with cheaper exports from Central and South America, and tens of thousands of small banana farmers will be dislocated.

Regrettably, this dispute has pitted the small states of the two sub-regions against one another. Some common ground, based on the interests of the direct producers and their respective communities, needs to be found.

TRADE RELATIONSHIPS

This brings me to the key issue of trade relationships. In general, the countries of the Anglophone Caribbean have a vital stake in preserving the privileged trading relationship with the EU that they enjoy under a series of agreements known as the Lome Convention. In this, they are joined by Suriname, Haiti and the DR which see the Lome accord as a means of securing development aid and which together with the Anglophone states make up the CARIFORUM group of countries.

Some Anglophone countries, but not all, also have significant exports to the US market and therefore have a strong interest in NAFTA parity and the FTAA negotiations. Here, their interests overlap with those of Central America. Central America, for its part, also has a strong interest in gaining free access to the Mexican market, an issue that is not on the CARIFORUM agenda at this time.

The upcoming Seattle meeting of the WTO, however, has assumed an overarching significance for both sub-regions. Apart from the direct requirements of the WTO rules

themselves, both the post-Lome arrangements with the EU and the terms of the FTAA agreement will be required to be compatible with WTO rules.

Central America and CARIFORUM countries have a joint interest in gaining acceptance of the principle, in the WTO Treaty, of special and differential treatment for small and vulnerable economies in the implementation of trade liberalisation rules. They have a broader interest together with other developing countries in pressing for a full review of the implementation of the WTO agreement and of the distribution of its benenfits, before new issues are brought into the negotiations as is being sought by the developed world.

From a longer-term viewpoint it is generally accepted that preferential trading arrangements such as Lome and the CBI will be phased out in the thrust towards worldwide trade liberalisation. This will draw together the interests of Central America and the Caribbean island states in seeking to ensure that the circumstances of smaller countries are taken account of in the evolving trade order. Civil Society will need to monitor the WTO process very closely to determine its potential impact on different groups in the population and needed responses.

DEVELOPMENT

The final aspect of diversity that I will refer to is in levels of development. The region contains one of the richest countries in the world, the Cayman Islands--just 500 km or so east of the Yucatan--with a per capita income which is about the same as that of the United States. Less than 1000 Km east of the Cayman Islands there lies one of the poorest countries in the world, Haiti, with one-hundredth part of the per capita income of Cayman.

In a sense this sets the pattern for the region as a whole. The non-independent territories and some of the smaller island states generally have per capita incomes in the $5,000+ range. These relatively well-off countries have only a small proportion of the region's population. The G3 countries with the bulk of the population, and Costa Rica and Panama have per capita incomes in the $2,000-$3,500 range. This is around the regional average. Below this are the island states of the Greater Antilles, the rest of Central America and the CARICOM countries on the mainland (Table 1).

The levels of human development show a similar pattern. Some countries, however, perform very well in human development relative to their level of economic development: Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Costa Rica and Barbados (Table 2).

POVERTY

Now we come to a characteristic that most of the countries have in common—poverty. On the basis of national poverty line studies, there are 17 countries, containing the bulk of the region's population, in which between one-fifth and two-thirds of the national population live in absolute poverty (Table 2).

The highest incidence is in Central America (except Costa Rica) and Guyana, where upwards of one-half of the population is officially classified as poor. Mexico, Venezuela and Jamaica, each have about one-third of their population living in poverty.

A rough estimate is that 35 percent of the people in the independent states of the region can be classified as poor—about 75 million in a population of 212 million.

Poverty, social exclusion and economic insecurity are common features of the daily reality of many of the people of our region. When combined with the weakening capacities of many states due to structural adjustment programmes and fiscal crisis, and with the pernicious effects of narcotrafficking and gun smuggling, this can be a dangerous cocktail.

In a paper prepared some time ago for UNESCO I suggested that countries of the insular Caribbean could be classified as "Societies at Risk". This could be extended to other states in the Greater Caribbean. There is a risk of marginalisation from the world economy, of political and social fragmentation, of a steady erosion of the capacity to shape our own development. It is this scenario that must constitute the primary points of reference for the action of civil society.

ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Let me return to the UNDP Human development Report for 1999, "Globalisation with a Human Face". The Report can be read as a call for the reform of uncontrolled global capitalism by means of a system of social management of the market. In such a system two of the principal players must be a capable and proactive state and an active civil society.

The terrains of action begin at the local and community level and move up to the national and regional levels and finally to the global space. Action should be built from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Local action must be rooted in the community and so on up to the global level.

Civil Society organisations will also need to find the right balance between national and international advocacy on the one hand, and organising for empowerment of the poor and socially excluded on the other hand. Pursuing advocacy at the expense of empowerment could mean absence of a domestic constituency. Pursuing empowerment at the expense of advocacy risks irrelevance. Balancing the two sets of strategies requires careful planning.

Finally, there is the need to handle the tension between the reality of diversity and the imperative of co-operation. This comes about by sustained efforts to understand local realities, history and culture, and to fit these into the wider regional and global picture.

CHILDREN OF BOLIVAR AND GARVEY

A thousand years ago, when the civilisation of the Maya had just past its peak, who could have foreseen that we would all be thrown together--the descendants of those who crossed into Alaska from Asia many thousands of years before together with the more recent transplants from Europe, from Africa and from Asia?

Today we are all joint occupants of this Caribbean basin, fractured by the scars of the colonial experience but rising to the challenge of regional co-operation.

The children of Montezuma and Cauhtemoc, of Simon Bolivar and Jose Marti, will yet join hands with the children of Quao, Kofi and other African freedom fighters, with the children of Marcus Garvey, Walter Rodney, Maurice Bishop and Cheddi Jagan; join hands in a common undertaking to transcend the barriers which history has imposed on

us and to create cohesive societies and a cohesive regional community. Let us set ourselves that goal.

1. Greater Caribbean: population, GDP, language

	Population	Area km2	GDP 1995	Percent			Ind'ence	Language
	Thousand		$ Per. Cap.	Pop'tion	Area	PC Inc(3)		
Mexico	90,100	1,967,183	2,775	41.6	37.4	109.5	1810	Spanish
Venezuela	21,852	916,445	3,433	10.1	17.4	135.5	1811	Spanish
Colombia	35,900	1,141,748	2,120	16.6	21.7	83.7	1810	Spanish
G-3	147,852	4,025,376	2,713	68.2	76.6	107.1		
Costa Rica	3,424	51,000	2,697	1.6	1.0	106.5	1821	Spanish
El Salvador	5,662	21,040	1,673	2.6	0.4	66.0	1821	Spanish
Guatemala	10,621	108,889	1,364	4.9	2.1	53.8	1821	Spanish
Honduras	5,654	112,080	696	2.6	2.1	27.5	1821	Spanish
Nicaragua	4,124	130,700	464	1.9	2.5	18.3	1821	Spanish
Panama	2,622	75,517	2,827	1.2	1.4	111.6	1903	Spanish
Cent Am & Panama	32,107	499,226	1,447	14.8	9.5	57.1		
Cuba	10,964	114,525	1,113	5.1	2.2	43.9	1959	Spanish
Dominican Republic	7,250	48,308	1,663	3.3	0.9	65.6	1844	Spanish
Haiti	7,180	27,750	285	3.3	0.5	11.2	1804	French
Insular non-Caricom	25,394	190,583	1,036	11.7	3.6	40.9		
Antigua & Barbuda	64	440	6,640	0.0	0.0	262.1	1981	English
Bahamas	279	13,864	12,258	0.1	0.3	483.9	1973	English
Barbados	264	431	7,120	0.1	0.0	281.0	1966	English
Belize	217	22,966	2,696	0.1	0.4	106.4	1981	English
Dominica	74	751	2,574	0.0	0.0	101.6	1978	English
Grenada	98	344	2,344	0.0	0.0	92.5	1974	English
Guyana	780	216,000	809	0.4	4.1	31.9	1966	English
Jamaica	2,500	11,424	1,762	1.2	0.2	69.6	1962	English
St. Lucia	145	616	3,083	0.1	0.0	121.7	1979	English

St.Kitts & Nevis	42	269	4,642	0.0	0.0	183.2	1983	English
St.Vincent & Grenadines	110	389	2,032	0.1	0.0	80.2	1979	English
Suriname	409	163,820	1,066	0.2	3.1	42.1	1975	Dutch
Trinidad & Tobago	1,262	5,066	4,101	0.6	0.1	161.9	1962	English
Caricom	6,244	436,380	2,923	2.9	8.3	115.4		
Aruba	82	188	16,810	0.0	0.0	663.5		Dutch
Netherland Antilles	207	783	7,871	0.1	0.0	310.7		Dutch
Dutch Territories	289	971	10,388	0.1	0.0	410.0		
Anguilla	10	91	5,932	0.0	0.0	234.2		English
Montserrat	10	102	5,155	0.0	0.0	203.5		English
British Virgin Islands	18	150	18,487	0.0	0.0	729.7		English
Cayman Islands	32	260	28,125	0.0	0.0	1110.2		English
Turks and Caicos Islands	15	417	7,021	0.0	0.0	277.1		English
British Territories	85	1,020	17,106	0.0	0.0	675.2		
French Guiana (1)	141	91,000	9,908	0.1	1.7	391.1		French
Guadeloupe (1)	447	1,705	7,585	0.2	0.0	299.4		French
Martinique (1)	360	1,060	10,895	0.2	0.0	430.1		French
French Departments	948	93,765	9,187	0.4	1.8	362.6		
Puerto Rico	3,700	9,065	11,450	1.7	0.2	452.0		Spanish
U.S. Virgin Islands	102	342	13,163	0.0	0.0	519.6		English
USA Territories	3,802	9,407	11,495	1.8	0.2	453.7		
Insular Caribbean	36,762	732,126	2,759	17.0	13.9	108.9		
Greater Caribbean	216,721	5,256,728	2,533	100.0	100.0	100.0		
(1) 1992 GDP data								

Source : based on data supplied Miguel Ceara, ACS Secretariat .

2. Greater Caribbean: Human Development

	Global HDI	GDP rank	Real GDP	Life exp.	Adult	Education	Poverty
	Rank	minus	per. Cap.	at birth	literacy	enrollment	
		HDI rank	(PPP$)	(Yrs.)	rate (%)	ratio (%)	(%)
High							
Barbados	29	8	12,001	76.4	97.6	80	8
Bahamas	31	-3	16,705	73.8	95.8	74	5
Antigua & Barbuda	38	5	9,692	75	95	76	12
Costa Rica	45	16	6,650	76	95.1	66	11
Medium							
Trinidad & Tobago	46	11	6,840	73.8	97.8	66	21
Venezuela	47	-2	8,860	72.4	92	67	31
Panama	49	7	7,168	73.6	91.1	73	n.a.
Mexico	50	-3	8,370	72.2	90.1	70	34
St Kitts/Nevis	51	-1	8,017	70	90	78	15
Grenada	52	22	4,864	72	96	78	20
Dominica	53	27	4,320	74	94	77	33
Colombia	57	1	6,810	70.4	90.9	71	19
Cuba	58	47	3,100	75.7	95.9	72	n.a.
Suriname	64	6	5,161	70.1	93.5	71	47
St Vincent & Gren.	75	8	4,250	73	82	78	17
St Lucia	81	-14	5,437	70	82	74	25
Jamaica	82	15	3,440	74.8	85.5	63	32
Belize	83	-1	4,300	74.7	75	72	35
Dominican Republic	88	-12	4,820	70.6	82.6	66	21
Guyana	99	2	3,210	64.4	98.1	64	43
El Salvador	107	1	2,880	69.1	77	64	38

Honduras	114		2,220	69.4	70.7	58	53
Guatemala	117	-32	4,100	64	66.6	47	53
Nicaragua	121	0	1,997	67.9	63.4	63	50
Low							
Haiti	152	-4	1,270	53.7	45.8	24	65
Notes.							
* First, second,and third-level gross enrollment as a proportion of the relevant age cohorts							
@ A positive value indicates that a country's human development rank is better than its GDP per capita rank, a negative sign the opposite							
Source: UNDP Human Development Report, 1999. 174 countries ranked. Poverty data supplemented by World Bank publications.							