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Lessons from the Struggle for a New International Technology Order

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Introduction

I first met Surendra Patel in the mid-1970s. He had organised a training seminar for officials in East Africa on the transfer of technology, and asked me to give a lecture in it. He followed this up with an invitation to come and join his team at the UNCTAD technology division in Geneva. I declined, for I wished to make my own contribution at the national level.

But I continued to follow with respect and admiration his tireless efforts in the service of development by fighting for what I call a new 'International Technology Order'. Surendra's work was a source of inspiration to me, both in its content and in his own personal example of commitment combined with professionalism and leavened with enormous kindness and sense of humanity. It is an honour to have been asked to deliver a lecture in his name.

Patel in perspective

Surendra was one of a post-war generation of brilliant thinkers mostly, thought not entirely, from the Global South, who strived to put economic

analysis at the service of the development of the world's poorer countries. For them economics was not a sterile discipline concerned with the efforts of individuals and firms pursuing their own material gain mindless of the effects of their behaviour on others, on their society and on their ecosystem. It was a tool to be employed for the betterment of humanity, especially that section of humanity that had been left behind in the tremendous growth of productivity and incomes that followed the European industrial revolution of the 19th century.

On the whole this generation of thinkers divided itself into two groups corresponding to the focus of their work[1]. There were those that focused on the internal dimension of development: they sought to understand how the economies of underdeveloped countries really worked and what were the internal factors that facilitated, or impeded, development. And there were those that focused on the international dimension: the features of the international economy that promoted development, or blocked it. Surendra's work on international technology transfer places him in the second group; although his magisterial work on technological transformation in the Third World is muich broader in scope (Patel 1995)

But there is a very thin line of demarcation between the national and the international dimensions of development; the two are closely inter-related and they followed a similar course in their influence on thinking and policy. The period of their greatest influence was the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Both

[1] This division is suggested by Ocampo and Martin's categorisation of the two schools of thought in development debates (2004: 112).

suffered reversals in the 1980s and 1990s; and both are making a kind of come-back today.

In this lecture I will be tracing the course of Surendra's work on technology and showing its connections with these wider developments. I will also be referring to our own experience in the Caribbean as illustrative of these developments.

UNCTAD

Let us start with the international dimension. This was the focus of UNCTAD—the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. This body had been launched in 1964 under the leadership of the Argentine economist, Raul Prebisch. In 1947 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had been set up to serve the cause of free trade; UNCTAD's mission was to have trade serve the cause of development.

This meant far more than enhanced market access for the exports of developing countries. UNCTAD's programme embraced commodity price support to arrest the tendency of the declining terms of trade for the exports of the developing countries, which consisted mainly of primary commodities.

It embraced finance—the need for an adequate flow of grants and low-income loans to developing countries to finance education, health and physical infrastructure.

It embraced international transport, to try to ensure that developing countries would not be at the mercy of the international shipping oligopolies.

And it addressed international technology transfer, since improved technology is the source of the productivity growth that underlies agricultural and industrial development. UNCTAD sought, if you like, a 'package deal' in support of development.

International Technology Transfer

In the UNCTAD technology division, Surendra was instrumental in arranging for a series of path breaking studies of contractual arrangements for technology transfer to developing countries. The studies revealed that the contracts and practices of multinational corporations were rife with restrictions whose objective was precisely to *prevent* the transfer of technology to users. Drawing on this research, Surendra published a widely-quoted paper on the problem of technological dependence in developing countries (Patel 1974).

The work of the UNCTAD technology division was a major reference point for our work on technology in the Caribbean economies. My colleague, Maurice Odle, showed that TNC restrictive practices had four kinds of pernicious effects on the firms using imported technology: to prolong its importation, to restrict its assimilation, to restrict is adaptation and indigenous creative activity, and to magnify its social cost (Odle 1979). His

study of Guyana and Trinidad-Tobago in the mid-1970s found that restrictive clauses of all kinds were widespread.

A study on Jamaica carried out at the same time found that 67 percent of technology agreements had secrecy and confidentiality clauses, 65 percent had obligations not to use technology after the expiry of the agreement, and 15 percent had grant back provisions obliging the recipient to hand over technology improvements to the licensor. (The study was conducted by a young economist named Owen Arthur, who is now the Prime Minister of Barbados) (Arthur 1985).

My own work used the concept of technological dependence as the core of the Caribbean *problematique* in dependence, underdevelopment and dysfunctionality in technology (Girvan 1979; 1983). I argued that systemic reliance on imported technology by government and the productive sector led to the underdevelopment of local technology and the application of techniques that were inappropriate to employment generation and the satisfaction of the basic needs of the population.

International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology

UNCTAD's studies led to an understanding that to call these arrangements for the "transfer of technology" was misleading as to their purpose and effects. Armed with this information, developing countries with UNCTAD's support led the charge for the adoption of an international code of conduct on technology transfer. The Code would bind the developed countries and

their corporations to eliminate such restrictive practices and to temper their business strategies to promote the kind of transfer of technical knowledge and skills that would support the technology revolution in the South. Negotiation of the Code was mandated by the General Assembly of the UN in 1977 (United Nations 1977), and Surendra played a major role in preparing the Draft that became the basis of subsequent negotiations.

The negotiations went on for almost a decade; but the developed countries would not agree to key provisions encouraging effective technology transfer and selectivity, those prohibiting restrictive practices; those requiring technology suppliers to abide by the laws and development policies of developing countries; those relating to applicable law and dispute settlement; and even to the proposed definition of international transfer of technology. This effectively torpedoed the Code, and negotiations were abandoned in the mid-1980s (Haug 1992; Raghavan 1985;United Nations 1990a, 1990b).

The NIEO

The fate of the Code is symbolic of the fate of the UNCTAD-based effort at securing agreement on reform of the international economic system, which was encapsulated in the campaign for a New International Economic Order.

I speak with some inside knowledge, since in the late 1970s I worked with the Administration of the late Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica, a vigorous and articulate campaigner for the NIEO. After that, in the 1980s I

worked for a time in the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations. That Center was the focal point for another effort, to negotiate a Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations that would oblige them to be, in effect, good corporate citizens in developing countries by respecting their sovereignty, obeying their laws, staying out of their politics and not bribing their leaders. The UN Code on TNCs would be a key complementary instrument to the UNCTAD Code of Conduct on Technology Transfer.

Both Codes of Conduct, and the NIEO itself, became casualties to the counter-revolution in economic thinking and practice of the 1980s summed up in the Washington Consensus. By its end the WTO had displaced UNCTAD as the central negotiating forum on international economic relations. Agreements on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) became part of the WTO agreement, which came into effect in 1995.

TRIPS

TRIPS and TRIMS entrenched the right of MNCs to engage in the very behaviour that the international codes on technology and on transnationals had sought to regulate, while restricting the freedom of governments to regulate this behaviour in order to promote development. The very incorporation of IP protection within the scope of a trade agreement was itself new. IP protection could as easily have remained exclusively within the aegis of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), as it was before TRIPS. By bringing it within the WTO, it

became part of the 'single undertaking' and subject to the dispute settlement and enforcement machinery. TRIPS and the rest of the WTO Treaty have the force of international law.

TRIPS has the effect of tying a country's access to export markets to its adoption of minimum universal standards of protection for IP, which is in fact held mainly by TNCs. For example the freedom that previously existed for countries to determine the areas of non-patentability, the duration of patents and the set of exclusive rights conferred by patents were removed and replaced with universal provisions fixing the minimum life of a patent (20 years) and requiring patents to be granted without regard to the place of invention, the kind of technology or whether the product is to be produced locally or imported. Similar universal provisions now exist for protection of geographical indications, copyright, trade marks and industrial designs.

The background to TRIPS was the emergence of new information technologies, new biotechnologies and new material technologies whose generation, possession and deployment are regarded as strategic assets in the economic performance of states and the competitive performance of corporations. TRIPS was a direct result of the exercise of power, of the ability of major corporations in computers, software, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, genetic engineering, chemicals and the like to shape the trade policies of the rich and powerful countries; and the ability of the these countries to pressure the weaker and poorer nations into acceptance of something that they were never fully convinced would be in their interest.

Of course anybody and everybody has the opportunity to take advantage of TRIPS—developing countries, small firms, artistes, musicians and so on. But the reality is that R&D in technology intensive industries requires vast sums of money and most of it is carried out by large multinational firms and very little by developing country firms. At the end of the 1990s developing countries accounted for only 4 percent of world R&D expenditures (Correa 2001: 12, citing UNDP 1999). TNC own the vast majority of the world's patents, and the statistical evidence is that are using their intellectual property more and more in overseas operations that they own and control (Correa 2001: 12, citing Kumar 1997). TRIPS reinforces the technologically dominant positions of these firms and reduces the pressure on them to share technology.

Changing bargaining power

As late as 1989, the Group of 77—the group of over 100 developing countries in the UN system—was denouncing the proposal to have TRIPS included in the WTO agreement as "a device to promote the trade competitive interests of industrialised countries and their transnational corporations" (Raghavan 1989). That they signed on to the agreement that included TRIPS and TRIPS and several other similar features in Marrakech in 1994 can only be explained by the decline in their international bargaining power through the 1980s and 1990s. The debt crisis, the Washington Consensus and the disappearance of the socialist bloc reduced their leverage with the North. New governments came to power in the South believing in the benefits of opening up their economies, and they were told that TRIPS would smooth the way to increased foreign investment and access to new

technologies. In the 1990s the benefits of globalisation were everywhere accepted as an article of faith.

Besides, the developed countries offered the carrot of increased market access for the labour-intensive manufactured exports of the developing countries, particularly textiles and clothing, as part of the "single undertaking". To sweeten the deal, developing countries were granted a five-year transition period—10 years for the least developed—to implement TRIPS; were assured that incentives would be given to TNCs to encourage them to transfer technology; and were promised technical assistance to help them implement TRIPS.

The unfulfilled promise of TRIPS

Within a few years it became evident that the developing countries had been tripped up; that TRIPS would not fulfill its promise to promote technology transfer to, and innovation in, developing countries. As summarised by Carlos Correa (2001), there were several source of disquiet.

First, in spite of the 5-year grace period granted to developing countries, the United States was selectively deploying unilateral pressures under Section 301 of the US Trade Act to force many countries to adopt enhanced IPR, contrary to their rights under the TRIPS agreement.

Second, there were the costly and technically demanding tasks of changing legislation, setting up intellectual property offices and institutions, and

overhauling judicial and customs system to implement TRIPS; and developed countries were not implementing their promises to provide technical assistance. Third, they had also taken little or no action to provide the promised incentives for transfer of technology.

A fourth concern was that TRIPS did not provide for respecting the provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which was adopted in 1993 after the first Earth Summit to protect the biological resources of all nations. And fifth, TRIPS was being used by MN pharmaceutical companies to drive generic medicines produced by local companies in the South out of the market and drive up the prices of drugs needed for public health programmes. Anti-retroviral drugs used for the treatment of HIV/AIDS were a particular concern.

Many economists were publishing studies concluding that TRIPS was unlikely to produce its promised benefits and was simply a device to protect the interests of the TNCs[2]. The case of Hungary has recently been invoked; a country that adopted heightened standards of IP protection as the price of accession to the EU, and where subsequently most of the locally owned firms in the pharmaceutical industry were taken over by foreign multinationals and the market share of local firms shrank from 70 percent to 30 percent (Raman 2005: 7).

Recent developments

[2] Correa mentions in particular Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard (Correa 2001: 2).

In short, the TRIPS experience is a vindication of Surendra Patel's view that the unhindered operation of the market by itself will not lead to effective technology transfer and development. Recently the developing countries have, rather belatedly, been expending much effort to try and regain some of the ground they lost under TRIPS. At the Doha WTO Ministerial in 2001 they extracted a Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, but the wrangling over its interpretation is still going on. They are now busily trying to get the developed countries to make TRIPS more development friendly, to place transfer of technology back on to the WTO agenda, and to include a development dimension into the activities of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) (Shashikant 2005; Raman 2005; South Centre 2005) .

Prebisch and the Centre-Periphery system

I mentioned earlier that UNCTAD's work on technology was one component of an international reform package that also included trade, finance and transport. The original source of inspiration for this approach was the work of Raul Prebisch, who had been Governor of Argentina's Central Bank during the Great Depression of the 1930s and who came to occupy a strategic position as head of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (then ECLA) and went on to become the first Secretary General of UNCTAD.

Prebisch modelled the world economy as consisting of two great regions: the Centre, specialising in the production and export of industrial goods; and the Periphery, specialising in the production and export of primary commodities.

His thesis on the declining terms of trade between industrial goods and primary products provided justification for policies of state-promoted import-substituting industrialisation in the countries of the Latin American periphery and the newly independent states of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean.

The Centre-Periphery model provides a link between the international and the internal dimensions of development. In Latin America, it spawned the structuralist economics of the ECLA school and led to the structuralist version of dependency theory, with which economists such as Celso Furtado and Osvaldo Sunkel and sociologists like Fernando Henrique Cardoso (former President of Brazil) are associated.

Internationally, Prebisch was followed by thinkers like Arthur Lewis, Hla Myint, Ragnar Nurkse, Hans Singer, A.K. Sen, Gunnar Myrdal and Dudley Seers. It was these men that established Development Economics as a new and legitimate sub-discipline of Economics. Their premise, which remained unchallenged until the neo-liberal onslaught of the 1980s,was that the economies of the underdeveloped countries were sufficiently peculiar in their structures and functioning that to require a theoretical approach different from that used for the advanced industrial economies.

The Caribbean and the New World Group

This thinking had its counterpart in the English speaking Caribbean, where it was associated with the work of the New World Group and the plantation

school that emerged in the 1960s. And the course taken by this intellectual movement in many respects mirrored that of Development Economics. Follow me as explain this in greater detail.

The foundational philosophy of the New World Group was that Caribbean people needed to have a cosmology, and a theory of society and economy, rooted in the peculiar experience and aesthetic of the region. Only on this basis, it was argued, could appropriate policies for development be devised and Caribbean people realise their latent potential (Best 1971).

New World scholars delved into the history of the Caribbean islands and adjacent mainland: a history of imperial rivalry; of subordination to metropolitan interests; of the institutions of the plantation system, sugar, slavery and indentured labour from the 17th to the 19th centuries; of the policy of industrialisation by invitation of foreign investment in the 20th. They held that the legacy of this historical experience, reinforced by current policies that privileged metropolitan initiative; was the underlying cause of Caribbean underdevelopment.

Out of this came the plantation school and Caribbean dependency school. At the core of this was the theory of Plantation Economy of Lloyd Best and Kari Polanyi Levitt; a type of economy established during slavery, whose essential structure and functioning persists to the present day (Levitt and Best 1975). From this platform George Beckford developed his thesis of Persistent Poverty in the Plantation Economies of the Third World (Beckford 1972) and I, my thesis of multinational corporations and

dependent underdevelopment in the mineral-export economies of the Caribbean and Latin America (Girvan 1970).

From this, too, came Beckford's theory of plantation society in which race and class were inter-laced as a result of the racist basis of forced labour on the plantation (Beckford 1978). And from it came Best's theory of 'Doctor Politics' and 'Crown Colony government' as the historical sources of the authoritarian and centralising political culture of the post-colonial Caribbean.

The decline of critical thought

New World had a huge political impact in intellectual and political circles in the Caribbean. But after the mid-1970s the movement went into decline and by the 1980s it had ceased to be a significant influence. There are some lessons that can be learnt from this.

I suggest here, drawing on Kuhn in his celebrated book on the *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) that any system of thought like New World goes through several stages of development. It starts by critiquing current orthodoxy, pointing to its theoretical inadequacies and policy failures. If it finds favour among scholars and also serves a political purpose for ruling elites or those aspiring to power, it eventually becomes an orthodoxy of its own. At that moment, it is subject to the most intense scrutiny by a subsequent generation. Its theoretical coherence is probed, and its policies

are put to the test by actual practice. If the weight of its unresolved explanatory failings and of its policy limitations passes a certain threshold, it loses its credibility and appeal and the stage is set for new ‘paradigm shift’. The decisive moment is signalled by a change in the politics—the emergence of political forces favouring its replacement by a new type of thinking. All of these factors operated in the case of New World and the plantation school.

There were several unresolved issues[3]. To begin with, there was New World’s theory of change that gave primacy to the initiating and catalysing role of ideas as a change agent summed up in Lloyd Best’s dictum “Thought is Action for us”. Thus intellectuals would specialise in study and the development of appropriate theory while teachers, journalists and political activists would disseminate the new thinking to the population at large and eventually put them into practice.

This division of labour was criticised as being idealistic by Caribbean Marxists and other younger scholar-activists, and the criticism appeared to be vindicated when several New World thinkers themselves came to engage in political action or took up positions in government.

Other critics took issue with the wholesale rejection of ‘imported’ knowledge that they read into the New World philosophy. They did not understand, and New World did not make it sufficiently clear; that New World sought after relevant theory rather than intellectual autarky.

[3] The following is a summary of the arguments presented in a longer paper, (Girvan 2005).

Mainstream economists critiqued methodological deficiencies in the plantation school for its alleged lack of hypotheses that could be subjected to formal empirical testing. Here the school fell foul of the emerging positivist hegemony in mainstream economics, which fails to recognise the value of insights derived from history and from so-called ‘stylised facts’, a stage of reasoning that must precede formalisation and testing.

Another complaint was that the plantation paradigm overstated the degree of ‘continuity’ and under-emphasised the degree of ‘change’ due to urbanisation, industrialisation and social differentiation in the 20th century. This boils down to an essentialist debate over the relative influence of plantation culture vis-à-vis modernity in characterising contemporary Caribbean society.

Speaking personally, I have to say that I firmly believe that the plantation is alive and well and living all over the Caribbean, even in societies where plantations are a thing of the past.

A major problem for the plantation school was the economic results associated with the policies of radical economic reform associated with the movement; policies of localisation or nationalisation of major export industries, land reform, economic self-reliance and regional economic integration. Michael Manley’s Democratic Socialist experiment and Forbes Burnham’s Cooperative Socialism of the 1970s were widely regarded as examples of its economic practice; and both were characterised as economic disasters. On the other hand Barbados and the East Asian Industrialising

Countries, which followed outward looking development strategies, were spectacular successes.

Dependency thinkers may indeed have over-estimated the role of voluntarism in bringing about transformation and under-estimated the constraints on national economic self-reliance faced by small economies that are tightly integrated into the global economy. But self-reliance is a relative concept, and it is not the same thing as autarchy. For instance, ECLAC's figures show that Latin America experienced its highest rates of per capita income growth during the period of 'inward-looking development' in 1945-1973. The period since then, during which it has opened up its economies in line with the Washington Consensus, has been characterised by significantly lower growth rates and a widening gap between its per capita GDP and that of the developed countries. (Ocampo 2003: 100-102).

Customising theory and policy

We should be careful, therefore, not to throw the baby of relevant economics out with the bathwater of failed experiments. Development Economics and New World thinking were expressions of a movement for the intellectual decolonisation of the Global South; assertions of the right to autonomy in thinking and policy. They had in common a conviction on the need for the customisation of knowledge to suit the circumstances of the local environment.

I wish to suggest that such a critical stance is sorely needed in today's world of neo-liberal globalisation; as an antidote to the claims to universal validity of neo-classical economics and to universal applicability of neo-liberal policies.

Had greater care been taken on this score, it seems to me that the standard neo-liberal package of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation would not have been so recklessly applied as it was in many countries and the results would not have been as disastrous.

There are numerous examples of this: Latin America in the 1980s—which suffered a 'lost decade', Russia in the 1990s, where life expectancy and human development plummeted after the Western-sponsored shock therapy and prostitution, alcoholism and drug addiction have reached levels unheard of under the previous Communist regime; East Asia in the late 1990s, where millions were driven into unemployment and poverty following a massive financial meltdown due ultimately to capital account liberalisation pressed by the IFIs; Jamaica in the 1990s, where premature financial liberalisation ended up costing the economy the equivalent of 40% of the GDP and left the government saddled with a huge internal debt; and sub-Saharan Africa in the 25 years since 1980, where many countries have yet to recover the real per capita income of the 1970s.

Indeed the accumulation of policy errors on the part of the IFIs has produced a torrent of critical studies, including several by mainstream scholars and by the IFIs themselves.

In contrast we have the relatively benign results of the carefully phased and largely internally driven management of policy reforms in countries like China, India, Vietnam and Cuba. This is not to say that these countries have not made their own mistakes, but that the huge social costs of the other cases have, in the main, been avoided.

The customisation of theory and policy starts with a recognition that diversity and heterogeneity in economic life are integral characteristics of the world community. It rejects the mind-set of market fundamentalism and sets the task of working out the appropriate mix of market and state in specific contexts in time and place. It is about careful, case-by-case consideration of the timing, sequencing and pace of policy reforms. It is about abandoning Eurocentric arrogance and empowering local actors and validating local knowledge in the design of economic policies. It is about social learning in policy making by continuous evaluation of policy outcomes. It is about humility in place of certainty, about understanding that what is important is not how much we know, but how little.

These issues are now the subject of rapidly growing literature and a number of institutional initiatives in the Global South and North, such as the IDEAs network, the International Forum on Development, and the Global Policy Innovations Initiative[4]. The title of a recent book by Ha-Joon Chang, *Rethinking Development Economics*, is symptomatic of the changing intellectual climate (Chang 2003).

[4] See IDEAs 2005; Hershberg and Thornton 2005; GPI 2005.

Asymmetries and Dependency

Returning to the international dimension, one notes too a resurgence of critical analysis of the world economic order. ECLAC's path breaking study of *Globalisation and Development* points to the growing inequalities in income both within nations and between them, that has accompanied the third stage age of Globalisation which commenced in 1973 (Ocampo and Martin 2003: ch. 4). The study is in the ECLAC tradition pioneered by Prebisch—it could as easily have been called 'Rediscovering the Centre-Periphery Model'. It relates growing inequality to three major asymmetries in the world economy: first, extreme concentration of technical progress in the developed countries; second, greater vulnerability of developing countries to macro-economic shocks; and third, high capital mobility and low labour mobility.

To these, I would add a fourth: asymmetry in the distribution of gains from international trade due to the structures of ownership, marketing and distribution, and the technological content, of the goods and services exported by developed and developing countries.

It is in this context that one may even speak of revisiting the idea of dependency. Taking the case of the Caribbean, for instance, one can observe that although dependency *thought* has disappeared, *dependency* has not. To the contrary, the substantive dependency of Caribbean economies and of Caribbean governments on foreign decision-making is probably greater today than 30 years ago. Trade/GDP ratios have grown steeply and now exceed 100% in the majority of Caricom economies; foreign indebtedness

has climbed and Caribbean economies are now among the most highly indebted emerging market economies in the world; IFIs are deeply involved in decision-making for the macro-economy, productive sectors and the social sectors like education and health; decisions by the EU, for example on sugar and bananas, and by the United States, impact heavily on domestic livelihoods. If people do not talk about dependence any more, it is because nowadays it is accepted as a fact of life—or rather, of globalisation.

It is of course true that all economies in the world have become more *inter*dependent with globalisation. Canada has, presumably, become more dependent on the United States as a result of NAFTA; the United States has become financially dependent on the rest of the world by virtue of being the world's largest debtor country. Dependence differs from interdependence in its asymmetrical relations of power. And the danger of accepting dependence as a necessary consequence of globalisation is that of passive acquiescence to the existing set of power relations in the world economy.

But is acquiescence the only option? Surely the dependence of small economies can be attenuated by regional economic integration that pools markets, resources and bargaining power to enhance the competitive position of local firms in global markets and to strengthen the bargaining position of national governments in global negotiations; by policies to build up local scientific and technological capabilities in areas of actual and potential competitive advantage; by identifying and supplying niches in world markets where small economies have unique goods and services to apply; and by identifying and exploiting contradictions among larger

economic powers in the global negotiations game. In this sense I agree with my colleague Michael Witter that:

> In the past, critical thought has identified the way in which the Caribbean was integrated into the world economy as principal explanation for the region's poverty and underdevelopment…The challenge now is to monitor and assess the impact of constant changes in the international economy on the region's development possibilities. Then, on this basis *critical thought must fashion new strategies for active participation in the world economy on terms which are favourable to the region's peoples* (Witter and Lindsay 1996: xxvi; my emphasis).

The continuing effort by the developing world—and increasingly, one might add, global civil society movement--to address the asymmetries in the international economic system is a complement, not an alternative, to 'active participation in the world economy'.

Conclusion

We have come full circle, for the import of Surendra Patel's work and that of UNCTAD was the subjugation, or at least tempering, of the untrammelled forces of international capital and the free play of global markets to a form of global social management in the interest of the welfare of the world's poor. That is my understanding of the meaning of the proposed International

Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology and of other similar initiatives in the 1970s that are being revived in updated forms in various global fora in the early 21st Century.

If there is to be any hope for a sane and sustainable future for mankind, the task to which Surendra Patel so selflessly devoted his life is worthy of the effort of succeeding generations.

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