

# **CREATING A CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT STATE**

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Caribbean integration has long been understood to be an important key to regional development. An important step forward in that process was achieved in July 1989 when for the first time the concept of a Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) received official endorsement at a meeting of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community. In a document entitled “Grand Anse Declaration and Work Programme for the Advancement of the Integration Movement,” the signatories declared: “we are determined to work towards the establishment in the shortest possible time, of a single market and economy for the Caribbean Community.” Their objective was “to deepen the integration process and strengthen the Caribbean Community in all of its dimensions to respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by changes in the global economy.”<sup>1</sup>

As part of this effort, an Independent West Indian Commission for Advancing the Goals of the Treaty of Chaguaramas was created. Headed by the veteran Guyanese diplomat Sir Shridath Ramphal, the Commission was instructed to report to the Heads of Government by 1992. The resulting document, entitled Time for Action, was as authentic a voice of Caribbean nationalism as has ever been published. The Commission members wrote “we do not pretend to be undertaking the same sort of task as Hamilton and his peers were undertaking” at the time of the birth of the United States. Nevertheless, they went on, “the purposes for which he [Hamilton] saw a union of states... are easily recognizable, and certainly appropriate, in our West Indian context today.” Without committing themselves to a time-line for implementation, the authors noted that “if our package of recommendations is accepted, the achievement of a Single Market within which people, capital and trade move unimpeded, the establishment of a common currency with a central monetary authority, and the adoption of streamlined formal machinery for conducting external negotiations in common will rank high in the list of objectives to be met.” Arguing as well for better transportation and communications and

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<sup>1</sup> “Grand Anse Declaration and Work Programme for the Advancement of the Integration Movement, Issued at the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Grand Anse, Grenada - July 1989, in *The West Indian Commission, Time for Action*, Second Edition (Kingston, Jamaica: The Press-University of the West Indies, 1993), Appendix A, p. 525.

an improvement in educational facilities, the Commission urged that “before this decade is much older these fundamental moves to closer integration and to nation-building must be made.”<sup>2</sup>

The nationalism that the West Indies Commission sought was not to be a uniformity imposed on an unwilling population. Rather it would be built “out of a sense of belonging which already exists, institutions for practical action where there is a community of interests in acting together in a society where the values and the processes of democracy are secure.” The Commission went on “this would be a nationalism which derives strength, not weakness, from cultural differences within that shared community of interests. It would be a nationalism totally unaggressive in its external ambitions and insisting not at all on conformity within.”<sup>3</sup>

Disappointment came quickly. The Commission held its first meeting in April 1990 and reported to the Heads of Government in October 1992. The members of the Commission had prioritized nineteen of more than two hundred recommendations and hoped that the heads of government would accept these and would declare that they approved “the broad thrust of the West Indian Commissions’ Report.” Instead, as Ramphael reports, in receiving the Report the Government leaders chose not to use the language of approval, instead merely acknowledging it “as a landmark document in charting the course of Caribbean integration.” Ramphael writes, they “accepted some of the 19 recommendations; but the exceptions were critical ones.” Perhaps most disappointingly in this regard was the fact that the government leaders did not accept the Commission’s recommendation for the establishment of a CARICOM Commission, empowered to “develop, facilitate, negotiate, bring to realization the dream of CARICOM as a Community of sovereign civil societies, CARICOM as a Single Market and Economy and CARICOM as the catalyst of the Association of Caribbean States.”<sup>4</sup>

Despite this setback, the process of regional integration has continued, though the pace has been halting. A Common External Tariff (CET) has been adopted; the principle of the CSME was accepted when the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas was adopted in 2001; and with “The Rose Hall Declaration on Regional Governance and Integrated

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 31, 32

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 32

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. xxxv, xxxiv.

Development” of July 2003, the governments of the region committed themselves to developing “a system of mature regionalism in which critical policy decision of the Community taken by Heads of Government or by other Organs of the Community will have the force of law throughout the Region.”<sup>5</sup> As recently as July 2007 the Heads of Government approved a document prepared by Norman Girvan which identified the actions that were required to complete the construction of a regional “single market” and the initiation of the steps required for the construction of a regional single economy, a process that it was hoped would be completed by 2015.<sup>6</sup> (Girvan, *Towards a Single Development vision*, p. 55-57)

Notwithstanding these changes, there is much yet to be done. Indeed in an unofficial paper, Girvan provides a table that indicates that, aside from establishing a Common External Policy, the creation of a Single Economy would require 210 separate actions, only 3 of which have been implemented.<sup>7</sup>

## II

In the absence of deep integration, each of the countries in the Caribbean was left to pursue development on its own. The results were mediocre, certainly nothing like the growth that was experienced by even small states elsewhere.<sup>8</sup> Between 1990 and 2005 only Trinidad and Tobago

Table 1

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<sup>5</sup> “The Rose Hall Declaration on ‘Regional Governance and Integrated Development,’ Adopted on the occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) at the Twenty-fourth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM,” Montego Bay, Jamaica, 2-5 July 2003, p. 2

<sup>6</sup> Norman Girvan, “Towards a Single Development Vision and the Role of the Single Economy,” in Collaboration with the CARICOM Secretariat and the Special Task Force on the Single Economy, As Approved by the Twenty-Eight Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 1-4 July 2007, Needham’s Point, Barbados, pp. 55-57

<sup>7</sup> Norman Girvan, “Caribbean Integration and Global Europe: Implications of the EPA for the CSME,” 18/08/2008 available at <http://normangirvan.info>.

<sup>8</sup> Mauritius, a small tropical island off the southeast coast of Africa, entered the post-World War II period with a strong structural resemblance to the countries of the Caribbean. Its annual per capita income was 5.3 percent between 1980 and 1990 and 4.1 percent between 1990 and 2000. These data are from David Lincoln, “Beyond the Plantation: Mauritius in the Global Division of Labour,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 44, no. 1 (2006), footnote 1, p. 75

## Annual Growth Rates of GDP per capita, 1990-2005

Country	Growth Rate
Antigua and Barbuda	1.5
Bahamas	0.4
Barbados	1.5
Belize	2.3
Dominica	1.3
Grenada	2.5
Guyana	3.2
Jamaica	0.7
St. Kitts and Nevis	2.9
St. Lucia	0.9
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	1.6
Trinidad and Tobago	4.3

Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2007/2008, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) Table 14.

experienced rapid economic growth. In seven of the twelve countries of the region, the annual rate of per capita growth in GDP was 1.6 percent or less. Most disappointing were the experiences in Bahamas, Jamaica, and St. Lucia where annual per capita growth rates averaged less than 1.0 percent per year. Guyana, Belize, and St. Kitts and Nevis did achieve more rapid growth than the others, but at least in the case of Guyana much of this simply represented the country's reclaiming of levels that had been lost during the stagnation of the 1970s and 1980s.

This unsatisfactory performance was corroborated by growth-accounting exercises carried out by the World Bank and reported in its 2005 survey of the region. In the growth-accounting framework, a growth in output results either because of the increased use of inputs or because of increased input productivity. Since modern economic growth is closely associated with the introduction of new technology in production, successful countries can be identified to the extent that total factor productivity growth remains at high levels. Unfortunately in the Caribbean, this was not the case for the years for which the Bank reported, 1981-90 and 1991-2000. Table 2 shows

Table 2

Change in Total Factor Productivity, 1981-1990, 1991-2000

Country	1981-1990	1991-2000	Increase (I) or Decrease (D)
Antigua and Barbuda	4.59	1.63	D
Bahamas	Na	Na	--
Barbados	Na	0.68	--
Belize	2.06	1.00	D
Dominica	4.50	1.10	D
Grenada	4.18	1.96	D
Guyana	-6.35	2.73	I
Jamaica	0.93	-1.92	D
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.43	2.65	I
St. Lucia	5.01	-0.26	D
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	4.41	0.47	D
Trinidad and Tobago	-3.07	1.09	

Source: The World Bank, A Time to Choose: Caribbean Development in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2005), p. 206

that the growth attributable to increased factor productivity declined in eight of the eleven countries for which data are available and in two of them, Jamaica and St. Lucia it actually became negative.

In light of these findings there is no surprise to learn that the region has not become an exporter of high tech products, another indicator of success in economic development. Evidence of this failure is provided in Table 3 which provides data on high tech exports as a percent of manufactured exports. Only Barbados exceeds the level achieved in the Upper Middle Income countries in this measure of economic modernization. For all of the remaining nations in the region, high tech exports are of negligible importance, a finding that is particularly revealing for Trinidad and Tobago, the leading industrial country in the English-speaking Caribbean.

To a large extent the region's economies remain based on natural factor endowments.<sup>9</sup> This is the case of course with regard to both its leading industry tourism, and also agriculture. But it is also the case in Trinidad and Tobago, where petroleum and natural gas are the principle sources of the country's relative affluence. No Caribbean nation has exhibited the kind of technological prowess in production that is the hallmark of modern economic growth.

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<sup>9</sup> Jay R. Mandle, Persistent Underdevelopment: Change and Economic Modernization in the West Indies (New York: Gordon & Breach, 1996), pp 125-149.

Table 3

## High Tech Exports as Percentage of Manufactured Exports, 2005

Country	Percentage
Antigua and Barbuda	1
Bahamas	NA
Barbados	17
Dominica	7
Guyana	0
Jamaica	0
St. Kitts and Nevis	1
St. Lucia	8
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Latin America and Caribbean	12
Upper Middle Income Countries	15
High Income Countries	21

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Data Base, 2008.

## III

Pressured by the European Community (EC) to come into conformity with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the nations of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) grouping of countries agreed in 2001 to renegotiate the terms of their trade relationships with Europe. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were to be negotiated, in which preferential trade arrangements were to be eliminated, replaced with reciprocal relations. The first EPA was initialed on December 16, 2007 between fifteen

Caribbean countries and the EC.<sup>10</sup> Under its terms the traditional Caribbean staples - sugar, rice and bananas – are scheduled to lose their tariff protection in Europe, while non-traditional products from the region were granted immediate duty and quota free access to the European market. At the same time, the Caribbean agreed to eliminate virtually all tariffs on imports from Europe over a twenty-five year period (the bulk of which would occur in the first fifteen years). Further, the EC pledged financial assistance to support the implementation of the agreement, though the precise level of that support was left vague as was the mechanism by which that aid was to be provided and utilized.<sup>11</sup>

Proponents of the Caribbean EPA argue that it will promote the region's economic development. The Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM), the body that negotiated on behalf of the Caribbean nations, issued a publication that maintains that the agreement is "a trade instrument with strong development components." Similarly, the EC sees the EPAs as an "instrument for development." The freeing of trade, it argues, will "promote local economic activity and attract regional and international investments." Such liberalization it asserts "will allow for economies of scale, will improve the level of specialization, will increase the competitiveness of the ACP States and will help them attract investment."<sup>12</sup>

But these promises are more than a trade agreement can deliver. Trade liberalization does not ensure development. Havelock Brewster's formulation is that it requires "an impressive chain of unproven theory assumptions" to conclude that trade liberalization with Europe will transform ACP countries "into a state of development."<sup>13</sup> There is strong evidence supporting this skepticism. Among others, Dani Rodrik has

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<sup>10</sup> The Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery negotiated on behalf of fifteen Caribbean states. These were Haiti and the Dominica Republic and the thirteen members of CARICOM (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, and Trinidad and Tobago).

<sup>11</sup> The Caribbean EPA goes beyond WTO compatibility. It includes the "Singapore Issues" that were debated during the Doha Round of negotiations but for which no agreement was achieved. These issues concern intellectual property and rules concerning public procurement among others.

<sup>12</sup> As quoted in Girvan, "Caribbean Integration and Global Europe," p. 9.

<sup>13</sup> Havelock R. Brewster, "The Anti-Development Dimension of the European Community's Economic Partnership Agreement for the Caribbean," p. 2. Available at <http://normangirvan.info>

demonstrated that a country's opening to international trade and investment does not ensure an enhancement of its productive capacity and the achievement of high economic growth rates.<sup>14</sup>

It is true that trade liberalization does provide businesses with increased market access. It may therefore enhance incentives for firms to be innovative in their product line and merchandising. But at the same time reducing the barriers to international trade does not ensure that the business sector will gain the capabilities necessary to take advantage of the increased opportunity provided by market liberalization. Clearly the EPA is being oversold.

#### IV

But the critics of the Caribbean EPA make a potentially even more damaging claim than that liberal trade does not ensure growth. They argue that the EPA will impede regional integration and in that way actually slow development.

The EC and the CRNM vehemently deny this possibility. Indeed the EPA itself explicitly recognizes integration "as an integral element" in the Partnership and that the Agreement "builds upon and aims at deepening region integration ..."<sup>15</sup> In his address at the ceremonial signing of the EPA Barbados' Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and International Business the Hon. Christopher Sinckler noted "the very sacred and surely fragile nature of our own CSME process" and reported that he was "yet to be convinced despite commentary to the contrary that anything in this EPA will so impinge on our own process as to render it useless." Conversely, he added, the Agreement "may even act to accelerate the pace at which we integrate."<sup>16</sup>

But the critics are more persuasive than the defenders of the agreement. There is at least a potential conflict between the requirements of the EPA and the development

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<sup>14</sup> Dani Rodrik, "The Global Governance of Trade as if Development Really Mattered," United Nations Development Programme (October 2001), pp. 21-25/

<sup>15</sup> Havelock Brewster, "The Anti-Development Dimension of the European Community's Economic Partnership Agreement for the Caribbean," p. 17-18

<sup>16</sup> "Feature Address Delivered by the Hon. Christopher Sinckler, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and international Business on the Occasion of the Signing of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and CARIFORUM," October 15, 2008, p. 9-10.

aspirations of an integrated Caribbean Community. The issue that is most likely to test the strength of the integration process is the dispute- settlement process contained in the EPA. A very detailed procedure for resolving conflicts is laid down in the EPA. The problem is that process is separate and distinct from a similar, though less elaborated, mechanism that is contained in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramus. The potential for difficulty lies in that fact that nothing is said about the relationship between the two or about the domain of one compared to the other.

The worry is that a dispute will emerge on an issue of strategic importance to the Caribbean, but which might violate the terms of the EPA. For example, under the EPA, local firms are not permitted to receive more favorable treatment with regard to taxes, incentives, or government procurement practices than European producers. Infant industry protection is not allowed. Nevertheless it is possible that at some time in the future the governments in the region may want to favor local firms over Europeans in the name of assisting Caribbean producers to advance their production and marketing know-how. If that were to occur and if the EPA dispute-settlement procedure were set into motion, it would immediately become clear that the region had ceded to the Europeans a strategic role in shaping its development strategy. Under those circumstances, it is hard to believe momentum to a Caribbean national project such as the CSME could be sustained.

But even if Sinckler is right and the EPA does not act as an important impediment to integration, the fact remains that the integration process still has a long way to go. Virtually all observers of Caricom and the CSME have commented on the sluggish pace of its advance and the fact that implementation lags far behind verbal and written commitments. Similarly there has been a great deal of discussion of the reasons why integration has not proceeded rapidly and what can be done to accelerate its pace.

Brewster writes that “the core of the problem resides in the fact that the Treaty of Chaguaramas is based on the intergovernmental mode of cooperation and thus its provisions are subject – whatever is agreed to in various Organs – to the discretions of national sovereignty.”<sup>17</sup> Before they can be implemented, agreements reached at the level

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<sup>17</sup> Havelock R. Brewster, “Mature Regionalism and the Rose Hall Declaration on Regional Governance,” in Kenneth Hall and Denis Benn (eds.) Caribbean Imperatives: Regional Governance and Integrated Development (Kingston and Miami: Ian Randle Publishers, 2005), p. 89

of the Community have to be ratified by each of the 15 member states. The pace of progress therefore is dictated by the most laggard of the participating nations.

While accurate as far it goes, this formulation of the problem begs the fundamental issue: why has the integration process not advanced beyond this “intergovernmental mode of cooperation,” to a “supranationalism” in which decisions made at the Community level immediately possess the rule of law among all participants. Another way of asking the same question is to query why a pan-Caribbean nationalism – such as evidenced in the Report of the West Indies Commission - has not been cultivated.

Survey data suggests that a proto-nationalism already exists among the people of the Caribbean. Ian Boxill’s 1988 sampling of the elites of Jamaica and St. Lucia reports that 79.0 percent of Jamaicans and 81.4 percent of St. Lucians agree that there already exists a “Caribbean Identity.” The sense of common identity is further illustrated by the fact that Boxill’s respondents overwhelmingly supported the removal of travel restrictions within the region (83.0 percent in Jamaica and 85.4 percent in St. Lucia).<sup>18</sup> There is, in short, a foundation for the kind of pan-Caribbean nationalist sensibility advanced by the West Indies Commission.

It is also the case however that despite this latent sense of Caribbeanism, parochial loyalties continue to claim the allegiance of the people. Boxill cites a study of Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda, and St. Kitts-Nevis that found the persistence of strong nationalist sentiment at the island level, and “a general skepticism towards political integration” regionally. To date Caribbeanism, though real, has not displaced local loyalty. Boxill puts it this way: “we still have not been able to reconcile the apparent contradictions between individual sovereignty and collective sovereignty.”<sup>19</sup>

In this regard, there has been a failure of leadership. The people’s consciousness of Caribbeanism has not been nurtured and cultivated adequately. A full blown nationalism has not emerged. As Boxill puts it, “CARICOM officials and regional governments...have failed to bring along civil society” in the integration project.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Ian Boxill, Ideology and Caribbean Integration (Mona Jamaica: Consortium Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of the West Indies, 1997), p. 74, 88.

<sup>19</sup> Ian Boxill, “Sovereignty and the Search for Recognition,” in Kenneth Hall and Denis Benn (eds.) Caribbean Imperatives, p. 26

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23

Brewster believes that this failure can be traced back to the West Indian Commission and its effort to, in his words, find “ways to perfect the existing economic integration instruments of CARICOM.” Brewster thinks this was a mistake because he does not believe that the economic benefits of integration are sufficiently powerful to induce nation building.<sup>21</sup>

Rather than privileging economic motivations, Brewster wants to construct a regional entity on the basis of what he calls the “first-best” activities – “those that from each state’s viewpoint are better pursued regionally, rather than nationally or internationally.” To that end, he advocates an innovative regional union “that would give expression to the West Indian people’s distinctive cultural and historical identity.” In this approach the region would be able to capitalize “on those forms of regional integration for which there are no superior alternatives.”<sup>22</sup>

Brewster’s strategy however is probably doomed to failure. Though it is true that a common cultural identity is, as he puts it, “far more developed in West Indian society than are reflected in its political institutions,” it nevertheless is within those political institutions that the fate of integration will be determined. Unfortunately it is precisely in those institutions that the advocates of integration and nation-building based on a shared Caribbean identity are desperately weak. Caribbean intellectuals and culture workers – the people who best have articulated a Caribbean sensibility and whom Brewster depends upon to advance the cause - have not achieved success in the political arena. This failure was shared even by the leading public intellectual in the region, the late Lloyd Best, who never was able to achieve electoral victory.

As for the professional politicians themselves, the problem is that they function in an incentive system that is perverse with regard to integration. Each is elected parochially, and therefore is responsive only to a limited national constituency. Faced with voter skepticism about the integration project, there are few office-seekers who are willing to confront and educate the electorate on the need for a trans-Caribbean identity. Regional integration rarely therefore is part of the political dialogue.

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<sup>21</sup> Havelock R H Ross-Brewster, “Identity, Space and the West Indian Union,” in Kenneth Hall and Denis Benn (eds.) Contending with Destiny: the Caribbean in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Kingston: Ian Randle Publisher, 2000) p. 38, 41.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p. 38

In a paper delivered at the SALISES conference in 2007 Malene Cahgni Alleyne provides important insight into the weakness of the Caribbean integration movement. In reviewing the determinants of successful integration, Alleyne remarks that “perhaps the most important condition facilitating political integration is the level of transnational flows and economic ties.”<sup>23</sup> The existence of those relations provide both a functional demonstration of the utility of integration and – just as importantly – a constituency with a vested interest in the advance of the integration process. The same logic would suggest that their absence would exact an important cost. Without close economic ties, neither a positive demonstration effect nor self-interested advocates for integration are present, depriving the movement of important sources of strength.

If those were present, politics in the Caribbean would look entirely different that they do today. The businesses actively engaged in intra-regional trade and investment could be expected financially to support political-office seekers. With those resources, the voice of integration in the councils of government would be increased. The public would be exposed to arguments in support of integration to a much greater extent than is the case now, with the likely outcome that support for integration would grow. Integration would be placed on the political agenda. In this way the movement for integration would bridge the gap between the need for nation-building and the electorate’s doubts.

But that has not been the pattern in the Caribbean. Intra-regional trade has historically been limited and there is even less investment. In 2003 only 17.1 percent of exports from Caricom nations were destined for other regional nations, a percentage which was only slightly higher than the 15.2 percent recorded in 1993. Furthermore, almost 70 percent (69.3) percent of intra-Caricom exports over the period 1993-2003 emanated from one country, Trinidad and Tobago.<sup>24</sup> It is particularly significant that relative to its size Jamaica played a disproportionately limited role in intra-regional trade, accounting for only about 5 percent of intra-regional exports. Over these same years, only

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<sup>23</sup> Malene Chagni Alleyne, “Governance and Caribbean Integration,” Paper Presented at 8<sup>th</sup> Annual SALISES Conference, March 26-28, 2007, Trinidad and Tobago, p.23

<sup>24</sup> More than three-quarters of Trinidad and Tobago’s exports were “resource-based manufactured goods,” that is, products based on that country’s petroleum and natural gas reserves.

Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana experienced significant increases in their regional exports. In both of these countries, exports to Caricom countries grew at an average annual rate of 11.1 percent. Elsewhere however growth rates were low. Again the limited participation played by Jamaica is noteworthy. Intra-regional exports from that country in 2003 had barely recovered to the level experienced in 1993, having declined significantly from 1996 to 2002.<sup>25</sup>

With this the case, there is no surprise to learn that in Boxill's survey, members of the economic elite in both Jamaica and St. Lucia were less likely than were members of cultural or political elites to agree that a Caribbean identity existed.<sup>26</sup> This then underscores an important source of the political weakness of the Caribbean integration movement. The region's economic elite does not have a vested interest in it.

Is possible however that the impression of very slow change suggested by these data is misleading. Trevor Farrell, in looking at the regional economy at the firm level, has argued that since the mid-1990s "we have begun to see much more evidence of economic integration emerging than in the previous 20 years." He writes that "over the course of the last ten years, there has been a mushrooming of cross-border direct investments in the region." According to him "a wide range of activities are involved, from banking to carnivals, from tourism to fast foods," with the largest investments in financial services.<sup>27</sup>

These developments may represent a trend which, if extended, may begin to fill the absence of business leadership in the integration movement. This particularly would be the case if, following a suggestion made by Farrell, region-side Business Forums were established. Arguing that social contacts are instrumental in the identification of profitable business opportunities, Farrell would like to see such Forums designed explicitly to bring business people together to negotiate agreements. It is not hard to

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<sup>25</sup> Inter-American Development Bank, Integration and Regional Programs Department, *Caricom Report No. 2* (August 2005), Tables 5 and 6.

<sup>26</sup> In Jamaica and St. Lucia between 80 percent and 100 percent of cultural and political elites responded "yes" to the existence of a Caribbean identity. In St. Lucia 50.0 percent of the economic elite answered in the affirmative; in Jamaica 68.4 percent answered "yes." (Boxill, p. 79)

<sup>27</sup> Trevor M.A. Farrell, "Caribbean Economic Integration: What is Happening Now; What Needs to be Done," in Kenneth Hall and Denis Benn (eds.) *Caribbean Imperatives*, p. 178.

anticipate that such organizations, if successful, could become the source of the enhanced private sector leadership for regional integration that has been lacking to date.

It may be as well that the debate over the EPA itself is a hopeful sign of increasing regional self-awareness. Precisely because the EPA covered the entire region, the storm of protest generated by the opponents reverberated widely. The Economist did not mean to complement the participants when it remarked that “the EPA has aroused furious opposition from an assortment of opposition parties, elderly academic, retired diplomats, churches, trade unions and NGOs.”<sup>28</sup> But the fact is that the debate over EPA was reminiscent of the kind of clash of ideas that occurred during the heyday of the “New World” group of intellectuals and academics in the 1960s and 1970s. Then, as now, Caribbean integration and regional economic development were seen by these scholars as inseparable. But now in contrast to the past, the process of integration is not just an intellectual construct. There is a reality to the CSME and though it is not complete it provides a foundation upon which to build.

And so it is that it might yet be possible to construct a broad Caribbean nationalist coalition. Intellectuals and artists will remain an integral part of such a movement. But they may be joined by segments of the business community. If that were to occur there is a very good possibility that the integration movement will gain the kind of political traction and popular support that has eluded it in the past.

Obviously the politics of such a coalition working to achieve integration will be tricky. The business community in the Caribbean not only has not joined with the intellectuals in the past; there historically has been a deep antipathy between the two. Similarly, the academic community is inexperienced in working with the corporate sector in pursuit of a common objective, since such objectives all too rarely were identifiable in the past. But if the corporate sector becomes truly pan-Caribbean, then the basis for such a coalition will have been created. At that point it will be the skill, commitment, and intellectual acumen of the participants that will determine the extent to which a Caribbean nation capable of achieving economic modernization is constructed.

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<sup>28</sup> “Trade Winds,” The Economist, October 16, 2008, <http://www.economist.com> It is not hard to identify who the Economist had in mind with the broadside. On the “elderly academic” side were Norman Girvan, Havelock Brewster and C.Y. Thomas. Retired diplomats include Sir Shridath Ramphal and Sir Ronald Sanders.