



**Applied Research
Center**

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

**The FIU-USSOUTHCOM Academic Partnership
Strategic Cultures Assessments**

Florida International University's Applied Research Center (FIU ARC), in collaboration with the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and FIU's Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC), formed the FIU-USSOUTHCOM Academic Partnership in early 2009. The partnership entails FIU providing the highest quality research-based knowledge to further explicative understanding of the political, strategic, and cultural dimensions of state behavior and foreign policy. This goal is accomplished by employing a strategic culture approach. The initial phase of strategic culture assessments consisted of a year-long research program that focused on developing a standard analytical framework to identify and assess the strategic culture of ten Latin American countries. FIU facilitated professional presentations of the following ten countries: Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. In addition, a findings report on the impact of Islam and Muslims within Latin America was produced. Thereafter, the partnership was expanded to deliver presentations on Guatemala, Peru, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Honduras, Panama, and Costa Rica, and presently, on Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Belize, Guyana, and Suriname.

The overarching purpose of the project is two-fold: to generate a rich and dynamic base of knowledge pertaining to the political, social, and strategic factors that influence state behavior; and to contribute to USSOUTHCOM's Socio-Cultural Dynamics (SCD) Program. Utilizing the notion of strategic culture, USSOUTHCOM has commissioned FIU-ARC to conduct country-studies in order to explain how states comprehend, interpret, and implement national security policy *vis-à-vis* the international system.

The partnership defines strategic culture as follows: "the combination of internal and external influences and experiences – geographic, historical, cultural, economic, political and military – that shape and influence the way a country understands its relationship to the rest of the world, and how a state will behave in the international community." FIU identifies and expounds upon the strategic and cultural factors that inform the rationale behind the perceptions and behavior of select states in the present political and security climate, by analyzing demography, history, regional customs, traditions, belief systems, and other cultural and historical influences that have contributed to the development of a particular country's current security rationale and interpretation of national security.

To meet the stated goals, FIU-ARC hosts professional academic workshops in Miami and brings subject matter experts together from throughout the US and Latin America, to explore and discuss a country's specific history, geography, culture, economic, political, and military climates *vis-à-vis* strategic culture. At the conclusion of each workshop, FIU publishes a findings report, which is presented at USSOUTHCOM.

This Strategic Culture Findings Report, authored by Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, is influenced by a working group that held a workshop in Miami on October 7, 2011. The workshop included six prominent scholars on Guyanese history, geography, economics, politics, foreign policy, and military affairs. In addition to Dr. Griffith, the experts were Drs. George Danns, Mark Kirton, Perry Mars, Desmond Thomas, and Nigel Westmaas.

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The views expressed in this Findings Report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Government, US Department of Defense, US Southern Command, FIU-ARC, Florida International University, York College of The City University of New York, or the institutions of any of the other scholars mentioned earlier.

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Executive Summary

In assessing how leaders leverage landscapes in Guyana this Findings Report embraces *contextual adaptation* rather than *complete adoption* of the strategic culture design. It (a) offers historical, socio-cultural, economic, and other contours of the **Origins** of Guyana's strategic culture, (b) probes the values and beliefs of its **Keepers**, (c) examines territorial disputes, drugs, and crime as core enduring rivalries and emerging **Challenges**, and (d) discusses the vicissitudes of the November 2011 elections and deficits in capabilities for credible national defense and public security as key aspects of **Continuity and Change**.

In terms of **Origins**,

- ❑ About 90 percent of the population lives along the Atlantic coastline. This leaves vast sections of the country under-peopled and under-protected. This habitation profile has deep implications for the nation's security given the country's challenges with illegal drugs, crime, and territorial claims by Venezuela and Suriname, among other things.
- ❑ The main resources are gold, bauxite, diamonds, and oil. Off-shore oil currently is being explored by several foreign investors. Guyana also has uranium reserves, which Canadians currently are prospecting; Iran and China also are interested. Most of the minerals and the oil reserves are in the area Venezuela claims.
- ❑ Guyana is among the poorest nations in the Americas, with high poverty and unemployment, and significant dependence on remittances. In 2011 it dropped lower on the Corruption Perceptions Index; from a rank of 116 out of 178 nations assessed in 2010, to 134 with 183 assessed this year, alongside Lebanon, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and a few other nations.

As regards the **Keepers**,

- ❑ The top leaders of the major political parties are important **Political Keepers**. The People's National Congress (PNC) and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) have dominated the political scene, thereby significantly influencing elite beliefs. The PNC began as a nationalist and anti-colonialist party but later touted Cooperative Socialism. The PPP preached Marxism, anti-imperialism, and anti-colonialism until winning power in 1992 when it faced the practical realities of governing in a post-Cold War world.

- ❑ Race-based politics has led to a new discourse about an “ethnic security dilemma,” which presumes that each of the major ethnic groups is obliged to develop its own security strategy *vis-à-vis* the other. The nation has been witnessing East Indian triumphalism beyond the political domain. The promotion of “Indian-ness” by the PPP Keepers has been a key aim and value for them.
- ❑ **Security Keepers** fall into two categories: (a) Policy Actors, and (b) Operational Actors and Influencers. Those in the first articulate policy, decide on it, and allocate resources to execute it; and those in the second provide advice in the three areas and execute policy. There also are influencers outside the formal governmental structure. They fall into two groups: Non-state Influencers, and Foreign Actors and Influencers. The first includes business leaders, and the second includes foreign diplomats.

In so far as **Challenges, Continuity, and Change** are concerned,

- ❑ Territorial claims by Venezuela and Suriname are the enduring rivalries. Venezuela claims five-eighths of Guyana’s 83,000 square miles, and Suriname claims the New River Triangle, which is 15,540 km² in size. Drugs and crime command attention as emerging challenges, not so much because they are new but because they are persisting, with new and dangerous dimensions.
- ❑ The future will be influenced by at least (a) the values and behaviors of the **Political Keepers** who “won” the November 2011 elections, and (b) whether and how they enhance the nation’s security capabilities to ensure adequate national defense and public security. The incumbent party retains the presidency through a plurality. But it lost legislative ground, winning 32 of the 65 seats, down from 36 at the 2006 elections. PPP/C control of the presidency but not of the legislature portends dangers and opportunities for Donald Ramotar, the new president, and for Guyana – opportunities being for racial bridge-building and shared governance.
- ❑ Given the manpower, equipment, and money deficits facing the security services they cannot adequately protect either the state or the society. The manpower deficits are affected by low wages and massive emigration, among other things. This affects national security by depleting the pool of skills available to the army, police, Foreign Service, and other entities involved in designing and executing security policies.

Introduction

“It is not only the case ... that we must think globally and act locally (that we must do) but we must do more in furtherance of global actions. It is in the global theatre that the ultimate destiny of humanity will be acted out. Our part will be a small one, but many small players will shape the nature of the scene.”

– Shridath Ramphal¹

The epigraph observation, by a respected Guyanese international lawyer-statesman, was offered in a region-wide Caribbean context. Yet, it is applicable to individual countries, such as Guyana, vis-à-vis foreign and security policy, among other things. More importantly, though, it is relevant in several ways to the subject at hand: strategic culture. First, it touts the importance of what might be called the **local-global nexus approach**, which is an important desideratum of strategic culture. Second, it posits the centrality of **agency**; of **symbolic and substantive engagement** by elites (players) in shaping both local actions and local-global outcomes. This, too, is a key aspect of strategic culture.

As might be expected—and is shown by Alastair Johnson (1995), Jeffrey Lantis (2009), and other scholars—there is a multiplicity of definitions of strategic culture. The analysis here embraces its definition as “the combination of internal and external influences and experiences—geographic, historical, cultural, economic, political, and military—that shape and influence the way a country understands its relationship with the rest of the world.” (Lantis 2009, 6) However, for several reasons, we need to offer some conceptual-empirical adaptation.

First, strategic culture initially was designed to assess the dynamics of large and powerful states, and not small and subordinate ones, such as Guyana. Second, the focus mostly was on their inter-national security intercourse, with the spotlight on external threats and apprehensions. The third reason pertains to key conceptual aspects. Constructivism has provided the strategic culture discourse with a major fillip. And, although some rudiments of strategic culture predate the 20th century, its theoretical platform in relation to security was grounded in 20th century Realism, which largely has been supplanted by post-Realist approaches that re-conceptualize security. (See Buzan

¹“Governance and the New Imperium,” in Kenneth O. Hall and Denis Benn, eds., *Governance in the Age of Globalization*. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003, 24.

1991, Griffith 2004, and Bowling 2010) Thus, security landscapes—of both large and small states—now generally are examined in terms of internal as well as external threats; both inter-national and intra-national security intercourse matter.

Accordingly, in what is essentially an analysis of synergies between leaders and landscapes, this author consciously embraces *contextual adaptation* as opposed to *complete adoption* of the strategic culture design. In this respect, and mindful of the methodology applied by the Florida International University Applied Research Center-United States Southern Command academic compact, this Findings Report first addresses some historical, socio-cultural, and other contours to facilitate appreciation of **the Origins aspects** of Guyana’s strategic culture. Understanding **the Keepers** necessitates probing the values and beliefs of the relevant elites, and the structural and functional elements of the security architecture. Moreover, assessing **Challenge** dynamics warrants probing the contemporary security scene in terms of enduring rivalries and emerging (and not so new) dangers. Finally, we ponder possible new milestones on the strategic cultural horizon in so far as **Continuity and Change** is concerned.

I. The Origins of Guyanese Strategic Culture

Geographic Landscape

Although geographically in South America, Guyana is culturally in the Caribbean. Moreover, it is the only South American nation whose official language is English, which is due to British imperial forays and colonial success in that part of the Americas. It is 214,969 km² (83,000 sq miles) in size, slightly smaller than Idaho in comparative United States context, and about 30,000 km² larger than Syria and 30,000 km² smaller than Britain in comparative international context.

For all Guyana’s physical size, its 2010 population was a mere 744,768, giving it one of the lowest population densities in the Americas. Indeed, the population has shrunk over the last few years, due mostly to a low birth-rate and massive emigration. A multicultural society, it has the following racial profile: 43 percent is of East Indian descent; 30 percent of African descent; 17 percent is mixed; nine (9) percent is Amerindian; and one (1) percent of the population self-identifies as “Other.” Some 90

percent of the inhabitants live along the Atlantic coastline, which is 270 miles long, and is up to six feet below the sea level in some places.

This habitation pattern leaves vast sections of the heavily forested country under-peopled and under-protected, a situation with considerable security implications given the country's illegal drug transshipment problem and territorial disputes with Venezuela and Suriname, among other things. Former National Security Advisor and historian-scholar David Granger alerts us to some of the dangers and realities involved: "Law in the huge hinterland west of the Essequibo River, where bandits rob and kill miners and often settle disputes with gun fire, is enforced lightly. Along the coast and in the estuaries of the great rivers, murders by pirates persist. Rural rape-murders; fatal stabbings among drunken revelers in rum shops; house-burnings and murder-suicides suggest distressing social decay." (Granger 2011: v)

The name *Guyana* derives from an indigenous Indian (Amerindian) term meaning "land of waters."² The term is quite appropriate, as Guyana has some 965 miles of navigable rivers, of which the Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo are the largest. The Essequibo—the largest of the three—originates at the Acarai Mountains in southern Guyana, near the border with Brazil. It runs 600 miles (965 km) north and empties into the Atlantic Ocean. Its estuary alone is 20 miles (32 km) wide.³ The country once was known as *British Guiana*, but the name was changed in 1966 when independence from Britain was won; the word **British** was dropped, and *Guiana* was changed to *Guyana*.⁴

Climatically a tropical country, Guyana's heat and humidity are moderated by northeast trade winds. There are two rainy seasons—May to mid-August and mid-November to mid-January. Further, Guyana's terrain has rolling highlands, low coastal plains, and savannahs. Mount Roraima (9,219 feet) is its highest point, and Kaieteur

²The Amerindians used "land of waters" not just in relation to Guyana, but in reference to most of the Guianas, including Dutch Guiana, now Suriname, and French Guiana, currently a *département d'outré mer* of France. Part of modern-day Brazil also once was referred to as Portuguese Guiana and a part of Venezuela was called Spanish Guiana.

³For a fascinating anthropological-geographical study of the Essequibo, see Berrangé and Johnson 1972.

⁴In 1970 Guyana's leaders took the ultimate independence step with the adoption of republicanism, which replaced the British Queen (represented by a local Governor General) as head of state (as still exists in Jamaica, Belize, Canada, and elsewhere) with a president. The first substantive president was Arthur Chung (March 17, 1970-October 6, 1970), with Edward Luckhoo serving as Acting President between February 23 and March 17, 1970. The presidency itself was changed from a symbolic office to an executive one with constitutional reform in 1980. Then Prime Minister Forbes Burnham became the first executive president.

Falls, with its single drop of 741 feet—five times that of Niagara Falls in the United States—is the most impressive of the 300 or so waterfalls, and is considered the country’s single most splendid environmental feature.

Guyana lies partly in the Amazon—which explains the wealth of flora and fauna; its main natural resources are timber, gold, bauxite, diamonds, and oil. Off-shore oil deposits currently are being explored by British, Canadian, Spanish, and United States investors. Guyana also has uranium reserves, which a Canadian company currently is prospecting. Iran is keenly interested in the reserves for its nuclear pursuits, and this was a subject of discussion between presidents Bharrat Jagdeo and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when Jagdeo visited Tehran in January 2010. (See Marks 2010; and Chickrie 2010) China also is interested in Guyana’s uranium.⁵ Noteworthy is the fact that most of the country’s minerals and hydrocarbons are in the area claimed by Venezuela.

Economic and Historical Landscapes

Although strategic culture assessments generally carry no explicit economic analyses, it is essential to provide a brief economics discussion for Guyana. This is one of the modifications anticipated in the Introduction. One might ask “Why?”

It is reasonable to expect that a country with the kind of economic and natural resources as Guyana would have a markedly better socio-economic profile than Guyana has, and not the kind of poverty and deprivation that defines it. Guyana is among the poorest nations in the Americas. This is attributable to four main factors. One is historically-influenced factors of race-based values and beliefs that shaped approaches to who gets what, how, and when. A second is internal ideological polarizations that correlated with and were exacerbated by external Cold War polarizations that resulted in political and economic destabilization, among other things. Third, the country’s economic condition is partly the result of politically-accentuated mismanagement.

⁵ For more on Guyana’s geography, see Library of Congress 1993, Chapter 2; Bernard 2005; and <http://www.iwokrama.org/wp/>. For more on uranium, see U308CORP 2011, which has some fascinating details about the prospecting in Kurupung. On uranium overall, one International Atomic Energy Agency report states: “The Guyana shield in northern South America, the Ukrainian shield, and the west African shield all have at least the basic framework to be considered as potentially prospective areas for unconformity-related deposits. However, these areas either have geological shortcomings or present extraordinary exploration challenges. For example, the Guyana shield is characterized by deep lateritic weathering, which makes it a difficult environment for geophysical prospecting...” (IAEA 2001, 62)

Finally, I anticipate that the next few decades will witness active exploration of hydrocarbons and minerals, and the beliefs about politics and power the elites adopt will shape decisions about that exploration and the country's overall development.

Economist Desmond Thomas considers Guyana's current economic condition the result of the combined effects of three factors: (1) dramatic economic deterioration since the 1970s; (2) structural stagnation and policy orientation around natural resources; and (3) the decline of major management institutions and of their allied skills. He correctly suggests they "influence critically the country's perceptions of its international interests, its strengths and weaknesses, and the foreign policy and strategic options available to it."⁶ Yet, not to be forgotten as an additional factor is the destabilization the country endured during the 1970s as its **Political Keepers** pursued a socialist agenda that was inimical to Western economic and ideological interests. Of course, Guyana was not singular in this respect. (See Premdas 1979; Mars 1983; and Dietz 1983)

Guyana's per capita income is US\$3,300 (2010), and its life expectancy at birth is 69 years, compared to the mid-70s for most Caribbean countries. The average child mortality rate for 2006-2010 was 30, compared to 18 in Belize and 19 in Barbados. Thomas explains that between 1980 and 2010 real per capita GDP was sharply lower than that for all the other Caribbean Community (CARICOM) members except Jamaica, making the 1980s practically a lost decade for Guyana. There has been limited progress on diversification, reflected in the concentrated nature of the country's exports, despite having a larger resource base than the rest of CARICOM. The relative mineral abundance—notably of bauxite, gold, and diamonds—and rich agricultural lands have led to a tendency to view natural resources as the foundation of economic development. Successive governments focused on the *potential* offered by natural resources, and harbored dreams of Guyana becoming "the breadbasket of the Caribbean."

Despite some high economic growth indicators recently, poverty and unemployment remain high, the economic and social infrastructure is dilapidated, and services are deficient. Remittances are vital for the survival a significant portion of the population. Indeed, the Multilateral Investment Fund reported that remittances to Guyana

⁶ Desmond Thomas, "Strategic Culture of Guyana: The Economic Dimension." Paper presented to the Florida International University-United States Southern Command Workshop on Guyanese Strategic Culture, October 7, 2011, 3.

in 2009 accounted for more than 10 percent of its GDP for that year. (See Maldonado et al 2010) Moreover, crime, drugs, and corruption are such prominent realities of Guyana that the term *narco-state* often is associated with the country.

In fact, in 2011 Guyana dropped even lower on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index; from a rank of 116 out of 178 nations assessed in 2010, to 134 with 183 assessed in 2011, ranking alongside Lebanon, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, and a few other nations. The Perceptions Index scores countries from 0 to 10 (most to least corrupt), based on perceived levels of public sector corruption, using data from 17 surveys on things such as bribery, procurement kickbacks, embezzlement, and enforcement of anti-corruption laws. Guyana's 2011 score is 2.5; last year it was 2.7. (See Transparency International 2011)⁷

Thus, the scathing assessment by the Washington, DC-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs in early 2011 was not entirely surprising:

Stagnation, violence, corruption, arch-sectarianism, and unfettered crime—this is the heritage that President Bharrat Jagdeo will bequeath to his country. Now that Jagdeo has announced that he will not seek a third term in the upcoming August election, he may well ask, as a New York mayor once did, “How did I do?” The answer, in this instance, must be: “terribly.” Chosen by former President Janet Jagan to succeed her in office, and supposedly held in high esteem by Guyana's founding father, the illustrious Cheddi Jagan, Jagdeo could only receive the lowest of marks from any independent evaluation. Through his tolerance of crime, racism, and dismal social progress, President Jagdeo has turned in a fifth-rate performance as president of one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere. As the Guyanese use every strategy, legal and illegal, to flee the dysfunctional country, Jagdeo will go down in history as a man who did almost nothing for his nation while in office. (COHA 2011)

As would be expected, there are historical antecedents to the country's contemporary realities. In looking back, it is important to acknowledge that what now is Guyana had many Amerindian civilizations before the encounter with the Europeans. Spain began that encounter when Christopher Columbus cruised off the Guyana coast in

⁷The higher the rank the worse the perception profile. At 134, Guyana was the second lowest ranking Caribbean nation; Haiti ranked 175. With a score of 7.8, Barbados was the region's highest ranking state, at 16. Others ranked as follows: St Lucia, with a 7.0 score and a ranking of 25; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, with a 5.8 score and a ranking of 36; Dominica, with a score of 5.2 and a ranking of 44; Jamaica, with a 3.3 score and a ranking of 86; Trinidad and Tobago, with a 3.2 score and a ranking of 91; and Suriname, with a 3.0 score and a ranking of 100.

1498 on his third voyage to the Americas. Later, in 1530, Spaniards attempted to create a settlement but were repelled by native Indian tribes. It took until near the end of the 16th century for a Dutch expedition to arouse Dutch interest in the area.

Guyana experienced the realities of the times: European geopolitical competition in the “New World,” with victories and defeats that led to revolving territorial “ownership.” For instance, in 1613 a Dutch tobacco plantation was destroyed by the Spanish, and by 1616 a private Dutch trading settlement was established strategically at Kyk Over Al (“see overall”) at the confluence of the Essequibo, Mazaruni, and Cuyuni rivers. The Dutch presence was fortified in Essequibo in 1624, and the first sugar mill was created there in 1664. The British captured Essequibo, Demerara, and Berbice in 1781, but the French seized it shortly afterwards. Later, the Dutch returned but were followed by the British, in 1796. The British presence was interrupted in 1802 by the Dutch, who regained control of the three colonial areas. In 1803 the three were ceded to the British with the critical agreement that they retain Dutch laws and political institutions, and in 1814 cession to Britain was consummated through the Treaty of Paris.

The year 1831 saw the unification of the three colonies (Essequibo, Demerara, and Berbice) into one—British Guiana. In 1838, the passage of the Emancipation Act, which abolished slavery in the British Empire, set the stage for the reshaping of the socio-political landscape in ways that define polity and society today. The abolition of slavery was not accompanied by closure of the sugar and cotton plantations. Hence, cheap labor still was needed. This led to the importation of indentured labor: Portuguese from Madeira, and East Indians from South Asia. As Nigel Westmaas correctly explained, “By 1911 (East) Indians had overtaken Africans as the major population group in British Guiana. The impact and outcome of ethnic disparity and conflict emergent in the post-emancipation era became a reality that would stalk internal Guyanese political and social life all the way up to independence and beyond.”⁸

The combined effects of colonial rule, slavery, and indentureship led to the inheritance of a political culture that emphasizes force in governance. The year 1992 marked the first relatively free and fair elections since independence. Since then, the

⁸ Nigel Westmaas, “History, Geopolitics, and Education: Notes on the ‘Strategic Culture’ of Guyana.” Paper presented to the Florida International University-United States Southern Command Workshop on Guyanese Strategic Culture, October 7, 2011, 5.

political order has been characterized by democratic authoritarianism, especially during the Bharrat Jagdeo period (August 11, 1999 to December 3, 2011) Thus, Perry Mars rightly explained that Guyana finds itself with the following realities: (1) the use of force to impose order on a hierarchical, unequal, and divided political and social system, and (2) a sub-culture of counter-veiling force against oppression and discrimination.⁹

Clearly, all the factors discussed above affect the “Who,” the “What,” and the “How” of **the Keepers** of the country’s strategic culture.

II. The Keepers of Guyanese Strategic Culture

Beliefs and Values Landscapes

Expectedly, the top leaders of the major political parties—especially the ruling group—are major **Keepers** of the country's strategic culture. Currently, the three main parties are:

- The People’s Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C), the major component of which is the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), founded in 1950 by Cheddi Jagan; he died in March 1997. In 1991, the party joined with an interest group called Civic to contest the 1992 elections as PPP/C; they won. Since then Civic has been marginalized, but the PPP finds it politically expedient to maintain the alliance.
- The People’s National Congress Reform (PNCR), formerly the People’s National Congress (PNC), founded by Forbes Burnham in 1957 following his split from the PPP; Burnham died in August 1985. The PNC lost power in 1992 after ruling for 28 years. This led to organizational redesign, including the name modification. As will be seen in Section III below, in 2011 the PNCR united with other groups to form A Partnership for National Unity (APNU) to contest the elections.
- The Alliance for Change (AFC), formed in 2005 by leading activists from the PPP, the PNC, and the Working People’s Alliance (WPA) who had become disenchanted with their parties’ politics and pursuits over the years.

⁹ See Perry Mars, “Guyana’s Political Institutions and Strategic Security Culture,” Paper presented to the Florida International University-United States Southern Command Workshop on Guyanese Strategic Culture, October 7, 2011, 1-2.

Guyana has a hybrid parliamentary-presidential system of rule, with the conventional three governmental branches. The executive is headed by a president. The judiciary comprises a High Court, led by a Chief Justice, and a Court of Appeal, headed by a Chancellor. Final appellate jurisdiction lies with the Caribbean Court of Justice, based in Trinidad and Tobago. The legislature is a 65-member unicameral National Assembly. Contending parties name their presidential candidates on their legislative lists, and the party with the single largest legislative group gets the presidency. Forty legislators are elected from national “Top-Up” lists to guarantee the highest possible amount of proportionality and 25 come from the 10 geographic areas. Parties must compete in at least six of the 10 areas and nominate candidates for 13 of the 25 regional seats. Plus, at least one-third of the candidates must be women. Presidential and legislative elections are combined, along with some aspects of local government representation. Within the last decade elections were held on August 28, 2006 and November 28, 2011. A discussion of the latter is provided in Section 3 below.¹⁰

The PNC and the PPP have dominated the political scene for the past six decades, thereby significantly influencing elite beliefs about the nature and pursuit of political power. In ideological terms, the PNC began as a nationalist and anti-colonialist party but later touted Cooperative Socialism, where the Cooperative and the State were deemed the central engines of economic growth, with the latter controlling “the commanding heights” of the national economy. The PNC also declared itself paramount over all other national institutions. It made dramatic strategic changes when Desmond Hoyte replaced Burnham after his death in 1985. (See Griffith 1991, 1997a) The PPP preached Marxism, anti-imperialism, and anti-colonialism for several decades, especially while in the political wilderness. It modified its positions markedly once winning power in 1992; it faced the practical realities of governing in a post-Cold War situation. Overall, as Mars noted, “the ideological differences between the two parties were relatively small, although they were significantly superseded by their differences in racial/ethnic make-up and orientation.”¹¹

Unsurprisingly, Guyana was caught in the Cold War geopolitical webs. In fact, it was fear about Marxism and Soviet influence after the Cuban revolution that prompted

¹⁰ For a discussion of structural and functional aspects of government and politics in Guyana, see Danns 1982; James and Lutchman 1984; Library of Congress, 1993, Chs. 1 and 4; Griffith 1997a; and Mars 2011.

¹¹ Mars, *Ibid.*, 5.

Western political engineering to remove Jagan from power in colonial Guiana and to change the electoral system to facilitate Burnham's victory. Burnham was considered the lesser threat; that is, until he nationalized the bauxite and sugar industries and embraced Cuba and North Korea, as part of his socialist agenda. One response by the West was destabilization of the Burnham government. (See Mars 1983) The racial overtones in the use of power and patronage by the PPP/C have led to a new discourse about an "ethnic security dilemma." This presumes that each of the major ethnic groups is obliged to develop its own security strategy *vis-à-vis* the other. Assertions during the recent electoral campaign heighten concern in this respect. For instance, in speaking to a mostly Afro-Guyanese community in August 2011, President Jagdeo urged them to "forget the past" about real or perceived injustices. Yet, he encouraged an Indo-Guyanese crowd to always "remember the past" regarding alleged or known injustices. (See Chabrol 2011a.)

This ethnic security dilemma and Jagdeo's polarizing language, which stoked racial fires hoping to retain political and racial dominance, spotlight some of the nation's identity challenges. On this matter, George Danns posits that Guyana's identity has evolved over five phases: (1) Colonial Identity (plantation slavery, plural society, and Creole society); (2) Nationalism and Political Independence; (3) Cooperative Socialist Republic; (4) Pragmatic Liberalism; and (5) Democratic Autocracy, the current phase. He suggests that each identity phase has had a dominant "norm entrepreneur," and has been marked by ethnic rivalry and class transformations. Thus, "the country's strategic culture is framed partly by these phenomena and the identity phases in which they operate. Its national security threats have been fairly consistent across phases and include external threats from the countries on its borders, and internal threats from ethnic rivalries, labor unrest, and rejection of authoritarian leadership and state rule."¹²

Brief attention to the fifth phase will suffice. With the Cold War ended Jagan no longer was viewed by the United States as a (minor) threat. Jagan had promised to honor the initiatives introduced by his predecessor, Desmond Hoyte, including IMF structural adjustment conditionality. Thus, socialism was no longer a credible option for the

¹² George K. Danns, "The Impact of Identity, Ethnicity and Class on Guyana's Strategic Culture." Paper presented to the Florida International University-United States Southern Command Workshop on Guyanese Strategic Culture, October 7, 2011, 2.

PPP, even if its leaders desired such. The party's East Indian base progressively lost its taste for the party's ideological stridency. They also embraced free enterprise. And, although uncomfortable with the regime change, Afro-Guyanese were tired of the austerity experiences of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), which was introduced by Hoyte in 1989 to pull the economy back from the brink. Further, they were tired of the hassles under Cooperative Socialism, some of which were due to Western destabilization.

Interestingly, during his five years in power, Jagan maintained the authoritarian infrastructure he both criticized while in the opposition and pledged to remove during several electoral campaigns. The 1992 campaign manifesto was clear: "The PPP/Civic Government recognizes the urgent need for constitutional reform. We propose that (a) the Fundamental Rights Section of our Constitution be preserved and strengthened wherever possible; (b) the Directive Principles be reviewed and abandoned where irrelevant, inapplicable, or inappropriate; (c) the powers of the Elections Commission be more adequately and unambiguously defined and its composition reviewed." The pledge continued: "The PPP/Civic, if elected, will propose that the powers of the President be reduced so that both the President and the Office are more accountable to the people. In addition, the PPP/Civic Government will invite the views of all political, cultural, social, and other organizations and the community as a whole, to join in a meaningful way in fashioning a Constitution which will serve Guyana." (PPP/C 1992: 4)

The PPP did make changes, though. A notable one has been the increasing removal of Afro-Guyanese from key public sector, diplomatic, and other positions, and their replacement by East Indians. Top Afro-Guyanese bureaucrats generally have been viewed as PNC loyalists and untrustworthy, and have been marginalized or victimized. The Foreign Service has been affected dramatically, prompting Mark Kirton's trenchant remark: "... Guyana's diplomatic status in the global arena has been significantly reduced since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been fossilized."¹³

Lending credence to Kirton's assessment are the prescient remarks by Cedric Joseph, a reputable, retired diplomat. He noted, "What a splendid opportunity has been wasted through designing such a constricted corps of Ambassadors and displaying such

¹³ See his "Guyana's Foreign Policy in the Context of Strategic Culture." Paper presented to the Florida International University-United States Southern Command Workshop on Guyanese Strategic Culture, October 7, 2011.

an imperfect face of [the] Guyanese polity for all to see! While a representative corps may eventually be reintegrated, the undertones of ethnic separation may remain for some time.” And, as to the fact that the “constriction” extended beyond that area, he added, “In this context if I may remind [you], no retired High Court Judge of African descent is currently retained by the administration in any professional capacity.” (Joseph, 2011: 8)

Perhaps the most outrageous defense of the **Political Keepers’** actions in this area was the contention by Roger Luncheon—Cabinet Secretary, head of the Presidential Secretariat, and Secretary of the Defense Board. During court testimony in August 2011 he asserted that the dearth of Afro-Guyanese ambassadors reflected the absence of appropriately qualified Afro-Guyanese. (See *Kaieteur News* 2011.)¹⁴ Kirton’s survey of the contemporary foreign policy scene suggests how the nation’s interests have been dangerously compromised by marginalization in the Foreign Service.¹⁵ Thus, without being deemed officially as such, PPP paramountcy has replaced PNC paramountcy. But it is a more pernicious pursuit in that PNC paramountcy was not patently race-focused.

By the time Jagan died on March 6, 1997, corruption and drugs had begun to attach blemishes on his party’s rule; the situation has deteriorated since then. However, the PPP continued to declaim against PNC rule and persist in portraying the PNC as having done nothing positive for Guyana; that the country’s achievements were all due to PPP efforts. Meanwhile, it maintained the PNC constitutional and political architecture and honored most of the programs initiated by Hoyte. Thus, political and racial fissures were being created alongside a platitudinous embrace of electoral democracy. The latter became formally a part of the elite belief matrix while masking undemocratic practices—such as restricting press freedoms and managing contract procurement in a patently racial and politically partisan fashion—between elections.

Beyond this, regrettably but not unexpectedly, the nation has been witnessing East Indian triumphalism beyond the political domain. George Danns notes that East Indian elites have been accentuating Indian culture in music, dance, films, festivals, and

¹⁴ Up to December 2011, Elizabeth Harper was the sole Afro-Guyanese ambassador in the Foreign Service, which has 12 ambassadors. Notable, too, she has been based in Georgetown, serving simultaneously as Ambassador to CARICOM and Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also, most of the Consuls are Indo-Guyanese. For the list of diplomatic and consular appointees, see http://www.minfor.gov.gy/tsite/index.php?option=com_wrapper&Itemid=99.

¹⁵ Kirton, *Ibid.*


language, clearly intent on making “Indian Culture” the country’s dominant culture. Indian Arrival Day was made a national holiday to mark the arrival of East Indian indentures in 1838. Cultural (and trade) links with India have been expanded, and relations with Islamic countries have been accentuated; an Embassy in Kuwait was opened in 2010, and Jagdeo visited Iran, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates the same year. Overall, the promotion of “Indian-ness” seems a vital aim and value for the PPP **Keepers**. Therefore, Danns correctly see Guyana’s identity as “locked in the dysfunctional grip of ethnic politics fuelled by the two major political parties.”

Security Keepers Landscape

A full appreciation of the dynamics of the **Keepers** requires going beyond the **Political Keepers** discussed above to the **Security Keepers**, to which we now turn attention. In keeping with our approach to security, our conversation extends beyond the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) because (a) the GDF has a supportive mission related to internal security, and (b) it lacks primacy regarding internal security; that mandate falls to the Guyana Police Force (GPF), with the Customs Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) playing a key role. The Joint Services Coordinating Council (JSCC) aims to facilitate appropriate communication between and among various security entities and provide operational and logistical efficiencies where the deployment of resources from more than one entity is required for implementation of a specific project or a general policy.¹⁶

¹⁶ Telephone interview by the author with Commodore Gary Best, Chief of Staff of the GDF and Chair of the JSCC, on August 30, 2011.

Figure 1: Guyanese Security Keepers



As Figure 1 indicates, the **Security Keepers** fall into two broad categories: Policy Actors and Operational Actors and Influencers.¹⁷ The two categories are distinguished by their roles, which are suggested by the labels I assign them; one category has authority to articulate policy, decide on it, and allocate resources to execute it.

¹⁷This Figure captures the elites as of December 16, 2011. Some Influencers likely will change within the first 30 days of the new president's installation as ministers build their administrative teams. There was a change in one **Security Keeper** that was unrelated to such, though. Commissioner of Police Greene was forced to proceed on leave on December 17, as credible rape allegations presented the new government with its first domestic crisis. Assistant Commissioner Leroy Brumell was named Acting Commissioner pending the result of the investigation into the rape allegation. See Isles 2011, and *Guyana Chronicle* 2011.

Individuals in the other category do not have such a scope of authority, but are vested with authority to provide advice in the three areas and to execute policy.

The Policy Actors perform their roles both individually and collectively, the main collective entities being the Cabinet, Defense Board, Central Intelligence Committee, and Parliament. However, for several reasons, Parliament plays a miniscule role in this arena. First, it has two formal entities with security-related mandates: the Committee on Defense and Security, and the Sectoral Committee on Foreign Relations.¹⁸ But those committees hardly meet much less hold Hearings. Thus, they are largely ineffective. Second, the *modus operandi* of the **Political Keepers** has been such that those committees are activated only when such is considered politically expedient or legally required. Security (and foreign policy) matters therefore are generally debated when Parliament acts as a “committee of the whole,” in the context of legislative or budget debates. Third, although Guyana has a hybrid presidential-parliamentary system, the parliamentary system features are accentuated in some areas. Parliamentary systems generally have a fusion of executive and legislative powers, rather than a separation of such powers, which characterizes presidential systems. As such, what is discussed—or not discussed—in parliament is largely what the ruling **Political Keeper-in-Chief** (the President) and other **Political Keepers** desire or permit.

Understandably, there is role overlap between the Policy Actors and the Operational Actors and Influencers groups. The overlap also exists in relation to the two elements of the Policy Actors group. For example, the President and the Home Affairs Minister perform roles individually **and** within the Cabinet and the Defense Board. Thus, they—and other **Keepers**—are guided by the constitution and relevant laws,¹⁹ or by institutional conventions. As well, while the heads of the army and police force are primarily in the operational zone, they have roles in the Defense Board and Central Intelligence Committee. Policy Actors are not all equal, whether in formal political or legal terms or in terms of informal “political heft.” Within the Policy Actors constellation the most important elites are: the President; the Prime Minister; the

¹⁸For an explanation of these committees and the workings of the National Assembly generally, see http://www.parliament.gov.gy/p_works.php.

¹⁹Some relevant prescriptions and parameters are provided in The Constitution of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, especially Title VIA, Section 197A; the Defense Act, 1966; and the Police Act, 1977.

Secretary to the Defense Board-Head of the Presidential Secretariat-Secretary to the Cabinet; and the Minister of Home Affairs. On the operational side the top five elites are: the GDF Chief of Staff, Commissioner of Police, CEO of CANU, and the Permanent Secretaries to the Prime Minister and the Home Affairs Minister.

Additionally, as happens in most small and subordinate states (but not only in such states), there are influencers outside the government and outside the national sovereign space. I see two groups: Non-state Influencers, and Foreign Actors and Influencers. Some of them have direct access to the President and other Policy Actors, most likely being part of the President's Kitchen Cabinet.²⁰ Elites in the first group include foreign consultants, especially those sponsored by the United States, Britain, the United Nations, the European Union (EU), or the World Bank. Featuring here also are corporate leaders, especially in the Private Sector Commission, the Guyana Association of Private Security Organizations, and the Guyana Manufacturers and Service Association. As to the Foreign Actors and Influencers group, some foreign diplomats are important. During the Jagdeo years there were public spats between some **Political Keepers** and British and American diplomats.²¹ But for several national interest reasons for all parties involved, British and American diplomats remained influential. So, too, have been Indian, Canadian, Cuban, Venezuelan, Brazilian, and EU diplomats.

III. Challenges, Continuity, and Change: Security Dynamics of Guyanese Strategic Culture

We specified in the Introduction and in the previous Section that both external and internal security challenges fall within our purview. As such, our examination here of enduring rivalries and emerging problems will consider issues in both the external/national defense and internal/public security domains. Of course, it is infeasible to consider all possible issues, or even to examine extensively the ones we do consider.

²⁰The term Kitchen Cabinet refers to an influential and informal, but unelected, group of advisers to someone who holds formal political office, whether elected or appointed. For an interesting recent article on the subject, see *The Economist* 2011.

²¹The main **Keepers** involved were President Jagdeo, Defense Board Secretary Roger Luncheon, Home Affairs Minister Clement Rohee, and former Home Affairs Minister and later Presidential Advisor Gail Texeira. For discussions of some of the controversies between Guyana and Britain (mostly about security sector reform), and Guyana and the United States (mostly regarding drugs and human trafficking), see *Guyana Observer* 2009; Granger 2009a; *Caricom News Network* 2011a; and *Caribbean360* 2011.

As with many perennial issues, Guyana's enduring security challenges have such contours that I am reminded of the French aphorism: *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose* (the more it changes, the more it remains the same). The emerging challenges have a desperation tinge to them. Thus, in keeping with the French theme, it is appropriate to ponder them under the heading of *s'il vous plait, mon Dieu* (please, help us, Lord!).

Plus ça change Landscape

Figure 2 portrays the two enduring rivalries: territorial claims by Venezuela and by Suriname. In the first, Venezuela claims five-eighths of Guyana's 83,000 square miles; all lands west of the Essequibo River, which is rich in timber, minerals, and oil. Venezuela calls the area *Guayana Esequiba* or *la Zona en Reclamación*.

The dispute has its origins in European geopolitical competition in centuries past. It dates to the 1840s, when the British commissioned German-born surveyor Robert Schomburg to demarcate its colonial territory from that of the then young Venezuelan republic, which had declared its independence from Spain in 1811, following the revolutionary efforts of Simón Bolívar. The United States took active interest in the matter after the 1823 enunciation of the Munroe Doctrine. The dispute actually was settled by arbitration in 1899, with active United States involvement. The arbitration panel comprised five jurists, from Russia, Britain, and the United States: Melville Weston Fuller, U.S. Chief Justice; David Josiah Brewer, Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court; Sir Richard Henn Collins, Lord Justice of Appeal of Britain; Baron Herschell, former British Lord Chancellor, who was replaced following his death by Charles Russell, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales; and Frédéric de Martens, a Russian diplomat and jurist.

The matter was reopened in the 1940s, based on a claim by attorney Severo Mallet-Prevost of the firm Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colte, and Mosle, who had served as Secretary of the United States/Venezuela delegation to the arbitration. Mallet-Prevost wrote a letter in 1944 claiming that Venezuela had been defrauded through collusion between Russia and Britain. He instructed that the letter be released only after his death. This occurred in December 1948, and in July 1949, the letter was delivered to Venezuela by Judge Otto Schroenrich, a partner in the Mallet-Prevost firm. Venezuela revived its claim in 1962, as it became apparent that Guyana's independence was imminent.

Figure 2: Territorial Claims Against Guyana



Relations between the two countries and their dispute resolution efforts have ebbed and flowed over the last five decades. For instance, active pursuit of the claim grew to intimidation and aggression during Raúl Leoni's presidency (1964-1969). In 1966, for example, troops occupied Ankoko Island, in northwest Guyana. Rafael Caldera (1969-1974) adopted a more conciliatory approach. This was the period of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain (1970), which was brokered by then-Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister, Eric Williams, as a cooling-off period; it froze the dispute for 12 years. Relations were

stable during the first Carlos Andrés Pérez term (1974-1979), and there was tension during the latter part of the Herrera Campins administration (1979-1983). It was during that period that the Protocol of Port-of-Spain expired, and Venezuela declined renewal.

The Protocol's non-renewal in 1982 led to reversion to the 1966 Geneva Agreement which allowed the UN Secretary General to help decide on a settlement mechanism. The parties agreed to a Good Officer (a *de facto* mediator, although not called one) as the Secretary General's representative, with a mandate to pursue rapprochement and dispute resolution. The current Good Officer is Norman Girvan, an eminent scholar-diplomat currently at the Institute of International Relations in Trinidad. A former Secretary General of the Association of Caribbean States, he was appointed in April 2010 to succeed Oliver Jackman, who had died in 2007. (See *Stabroek News* 2010.)

September 2011 saw new rumblings. Venezuela filed a diplomatic protest after Guyana's September 6, 2011 request to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, for an extended continental shelf of 150 nautical miles—something it has a right to request. Some individuals in Venezuela consider such as compromising Venezuela's claim. This renewed chauvinism is understandable, although not endorsed. With elections due in October 2012, the "electoral season" has begun, and presidential hopefuls are pulling out their nationalist guns. The official protest led to a September 30, 2011 meeting in Trinidad and Tobago between the two Foreign Ministers and their advisors, along with Girvan. (Camacho 2011; *Stabroek News* 2011; Khan 2011; and *El Nuevo Herald* 2011)

At the end of the meeting the two Foreign Ministers issued a Joint Statement. Among other things, the Statement (Joint Statement 2011) indicated: "In discussing Guyana's submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Guyana stated that it recognized the right of the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to make its views known to the Commission. The two Ministers agreed that their respective facilitators will discuss issues related to Guyana's submission and report to their respective Governments." The Statement acknowledged the existence of the dispute and the reaffirmed the commitment of the two countries to Geneva Agreement and the Good Offices process. It also noted that, "The Ministers recognized that this controversy is a legacy of colonialism and must be resolved."

In relation to Suriname, there are two sets of issues: one is about land—the unresolved New River Triangle; the other pertains to the maritime dispute that was resolved in 2007 but still has some residual aspects. Figure 2 shows the still-disputed area: 15,540 km² (6,000 square miles) of territory that is resource-rich, with timber and minerals. The dispute goes back to the 19th century. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands actually reached an agreement in the 1940s, but preoccupation with World War II matters precluded consummation of the treaty. There was an incursion by Suriname in 1967, which Guyanese security forces repelled. (See Granger 2009b) Later, in 1989, a Border Mixed Commission was established as a framework for rapprochement and to move the parties progressively towards resolution. However, that Commission has been dormant for several years; *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*.

Meanwhile, over the last few decades there have been many diplomatic and security twists and turns. Aside from the June 2000 naval encounter over the maritime dispute that was formally resolved in 2007, perhaps the most significant development was Suriname's presentation internationally what it long had done nationally: show the New River Triangle as part of Suriname. The occasion was the World Bank Low Carbon Development Strategy Forum, held in October 2009 in Washington, DC. Guyana feebly protested the audacious move but it was unable to secure the map's withdrawal. This reflects its relative diplomatic (and military) ineffectiveness.²²

More significantly, Suriname's move has set the stage for eventual *de facto* acceptance internationally of its cartographic definition of itself, irrespective of the status of the dispute or the *de jure* ownership of the Triangle. Hence, my prediction is that now that Suriname's definition of itself has had an international début, especially having been presented at a World Bank forum, it will be reproduced and used by others and slowly will become the geographic definition of Suriname in the eyes of the world. This is all the more so since Suriname recently began to depict itself as inclusive of the New River Triangle on the web site of its embassy in Washington, DC.²³

²² I mention military effectiveness not to suggest that military measures should have been taken but because the possession of military capabilities, and sometimes just the perception of it, can influence outcomes, especially when such fundamental interests as territorial possession (or the definition of it) are involved.

²³ See <http://www.surinameembassy.org/>.

President Desi Bouterse of Suriname, who was elected in July 2010, engaged his then lame-duck counterpart in Guyana in a flurry of activities after his return to power. Presidential summits were held in September 2010, November 2010, and February 2011. However, that engagement seemed more about symbolism than about substance. In June 2011 Bouterse told his parliament that he will actively pursue a peaceful resolution of the dispute. (*Caricom News Network* 2011b) So far there is little public evidence of actual initiatives along these lines.²⁴ Overall, *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*.

S'il vous plait, mon Dieu Landscape

In terms of internal (public) security, crime generally—and homicides in particular—constitutes the preeminent threat. Crime is not new, but it is persisting, with troubling new aspects, including a dramatic increase in domestic violence. (See Granger 2011, 33-39; and Help and Shelter 2011) The situation is so urgent and desperate that pleas for heavenly and earthly help come from citizens as well as from within the security services.

The Crime Challenge

Not unlike other jurisdictions, the upsurge in crime in Guyana has many elements, including illegal operations, economic deprivation; corruption; and general anomie. The capability deficits and inefficiencies of the security agencies also are factors.

The focus here is on murders. This is not to suggest that assault, rape, domestic violence, and other crimes are unimportant, or have not increased in some cases. Murders command attention here because they constitute the “ultimate crime,” with human finality and powerful economic, social, and other consequences. A recent comparative analysis (*Guyana Review* 2010) offered some depressing data:

There were about three cases of murder and manslaughter every month in colonial British Guiana fifty years ago. There is about one murder every three days in independent Guyana today. Guyana’s murder rate per 100,000 members of the population seems never [to have] been in single digits over the past two decades. It soared to 19.2 per 100, 000 during the crime spree in several East Coast villages between 2003 and 2005, but fell to 15.1 in 2008. There were 1,100 murders during the period 1990-1999. This rose to 1,431 during 2000-2009.

²⁴ Some of the discussion on Suriname here draws on Griffith 2011. For more on the histories and dynamics of the two disputes, see Donovan 2003; Granger 2005; Joseph 2007; and Ramphal 2008.

Official data published after the *Guyana Review* study show a worsening of the situation: **reported murders** increased from 117 in 2009 to 138 in 2010, an increase of almost 18 percent. I highlight **reported murders** because in many areas low confidence in the effectiveness of basic law enforcement and the broader criminal justice system leads citizens to under-report crime, or take justice into their own hands, or do both. Yet, it is not just the numbers that are sobering. Crime and responses to it by both citizens and the state reflect values and value-shifting, some of which are quite disconcerting.

In this respect, the *Guyana Review* study observes that:

A country's murder rate is an infallible indicator of the value that its people place on human life. In Guyana's case, the images of the bodies of murdered victims flung onto the floors of police wagons, of the cadavers of seamen washed up on the foreshore or, as in the aftermath of the Bartica township massacre, stacked like animal carcasses in an open boat, no longer astonish. These images are a reflection of the real loss of respect by officials even for human remains. They suggest a cynical disregard for life. (*Guyana Review* 2010)

To make matters worse, too often some people who pledge to protect society from crime become perpetrators of crime, because of corruption, desperation to solve cases, or other reasons. Still fresh in the national memory is one of the most egregious cases of desperation to solve a crime that led to policemen becoming criminals. It involved the torture of a teenager, 14-year-old Twyon Thomas, **in a police station**, between October 27 and 31, 2009. The policemen suspected that Thomas had been involved in the murder of a local politician, Raminauth Bisram, Deputy Chair of Region Three. The interrogation involved covering his head with a T-shirt, tying his hands with wire, and then dousing his genitals with mentholated spirits and setting him alight. Sadly, too, that case involved complicity of a medical doctor. The two policemen involved, Sergeant Narine Lall and Constable Mohanram Dulai, were charged but the cases against them were dismissed after neither the victim nor his mother appeared for the trial, allegedly having been paid off by the attorneys representing the policemen.

However, the Guyana Police Force was sued successfully. Justice Roxanne George rendered her decision in the case in June 2011. She ordered a total payment of G\$6.5 million (US\$32,386), about half for torture and degrading punishment. She affirmed: "The torture and cruel and inhuman treatment meted out to Thomas has

demonstrated and established an absolute and flagrant disregard for his constitutional rights.”The judge also declared unlawful the teenager’s detention and denial of a hospital visit, despite his injuries and the intervention of his mother and attorney. “How it was that the police hoped to keep such a horrendous occurrence under wraps was a mystery,” she wondered, adding that his fundamental rights were violated not only by acts and omissions by the policemen directly involved, but also by others in the police force, including police surgeon Dr. Mahendra K. Chand. (Charbol 2011b)

The judge also noted: “By failing to provide him with any medical examination for over a day after he was burnt, the unprofessional medical attention he received, and by failing to permit him to go to hospital for further medical attention for another two days, they displayed a callous indifference, lack of care, and an absence of concern for Thomas as a detainee and as a child.” (Charbol 2011b) The Attorney General appealed the decision on behalf of the Police Force. Hence, it is unclear when, if ever, Thomas will get some semblance of justice for the ordeal he endured; *s’il vous plait, mon Dieu*.

The Drugs Challenge

For the last few decades the creativity and daring of drug traffickers have been commanding media headlines in and out of Guyana. Here are two examples during 2011: May 11 *Caricom News Network*: “Guyana: Drugs in Agri-Exports a Living Nightmare—Minister Persaud;” August 23 *Guyana Chronicle*: “Cocaine in Kunds.”

Yet, what is true for all Caribbean and Latin American (and other societies) experiencing the drugs drama also is true for Guyana: it is not merely a matter of trafficking; in Guyana (and elsewhere) there is the cultivation of an illegal product—marijuana; the consumption and abuse of illegal substances, and not just marijuana; and the laundering of drug money. (See Griffith 1997b; and Griffith 2009)

Space limitations preclude extensive examination of this challenge here; some vignettes from the 2011 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* will suffice:

Guyana is a transshipment point for cocaine from Colombia and Venezuela destined for North America, Europe, and the Caribbean. Generally, small aircraft transporting cocaine land at remote airstrips in Guyana’s unpopulated interior highlands or coastal savanna regions to refuel and continue on to offshore

destinations. Due to weak land and maritime border controls and a vast unpatrolled interior, drug traffickers are able to conduct operations without significant interference from law enforcement agencies.

The uncontrolled borders and coastal areas of Guyana allow for unfettered drug transit. Light aircraft land at numerous isolated airstrips or make airdrops where operatives on the ground retrieve the drugs. Smugglers use small boats and freighters to enter Guyana's many remote but navigable rivers. Smugglers also take direct routes, such as driving or boating across the borders with Brazil, Suriname, and Venezuela. Once inside the country narcotics are transported to Georgetown by road, water, or air and then sent on to the Caribbean, North America, or Europe.

Overall, Guyana's 2010 counternarcotics activities were challenged by the consistently marginal commitment and capacity at all levels of government, despite some achievements late in the year. Movements to modernize a colonial-era legal system based on English common law often stall or lack priority. Signed into law in 2008, the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act (AMLCFTA), the Interception of Communications Bill, and the Criminal Procedure Bill were designed to enhance both the investigative capability of law enforcement authorities and prosecutors' ability to obtain convictions in drug-related cases. . (United States Department of State 2011)

The document also credits the Guyanese authorities with using the AMLCFTA in 2010 when a Guyana Revenue Authority worker was convicted in the first use of the legislation, with significant British assistance. The *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* also notes that: "Guyana's ability to deal with drug abusers is impeded by the modest financial resources available to support rehabilitation programs. It only has two residential facilities that treat substance abuse: the Salvation Army and the Phoenix Recovery Center. Both are partially funded by the government, but they have budgetary constraints and often rely on donations from addict's families to stay open."

Whether the drugs threat is viewed alone or alongside the crime threat, Guyana finds itself with enduring-plus challenges that justify the plea, *s'il vous plait, mon Dieu*.

Continuity versus Change

Guyana's strategic cultural horizon will be influenced by at least two factors:

1. The values and practices of the **Political Keepers** identified to lead the nation as a result of the November 28, 2011 elections; and
2. Whether and how those **Political Keepers** enhance the nation's security capabilities to better align beliefs and national interest.

Electoral Landscape

As regards the elections, although Guyana was not part of Roberto Espíndola's unit of analysis what he said resonates with the recent elections there: "Elections in Latin America [and the Caribbean] keep showing that the region retains its capacity to surprise observers, as well as a potential to generate expectations." (Espíndola 2009, 141) The Guyanese elections were full of surprises, both in the run up to them and in the results. Two sets of pre-election surprises are noteworthy. One relates to party defections and political realignments by individuals, driven by one or several of the following: expediency, discontent, and opportunism.²⁵ Some prominent cases were:

- ❑ Moses Nagamootoo, a PPP Central Committee member and parliamentarian, to the AFC. Over recent years Nagamootoo had become a PPP/C insider-critic. Among other things, he openly challenged the party hierarchy for its undemocratic approach to selecting its presidential candidate, a position he had sought. Donald Ramotar's selection involved no participation by the party's general membership. Apparently his selection long had been pre-determined; the Central Committee's April 4, 2011 decision merely provided *pro forma* legitimacy to that pre-determination.
- ❑ PPP/C stalwart Rajendra Bissessar defected to the AFC, and Richard Van West Charles, one-time PNC Health Minister and son-in-law of PNC founder Forbes Burnham, did the same. Van West Charles had sought to become the PNCR leader, and became disaffected with both the outcome of the leadership contest and the party's overall political strategy.

²⁵ The surprise lies not in the fact of defections, which is normal in the run up to elections, but in some of "Who" and the "To Whom" of some of the defections.

- Philip Bynoe, a former staunch PNC activist, who once was imprisoned for treason and later pardoned by President Jagdeo; Frederick McWilfred, once a prominent PNC national-level operative; and Peter Ramsaroop, former AFC Chairman, all defected to the PPP/C. These defections seem to have been prompted by a mixture of disenchantment, expediency, and the lure of PPP/C political and financial spoils.²⁶

Table 1: Results of the November 28, 2011 Elections in Guyana

GECOM FINAL RESULTS											
(GENERAL)											
PARTY	REGIONS										TOTAL VOTES
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
APNU	887	3,254	14,028	84,828	8,906	10,798	2,843	739	2,004	11,358	139, 678
AFC	787	2,159	3,343	10,635	3,079	11,634	505	995	946	1,324	35, 333
PPP/C	3,472	12,450	33,424	60,851	13,558	32,360	2,376	741	4,135	2,860	166, 340
TUF	55	69	70	145	29	83	84	95	183	34	885

SEAT ALLOCATIONS FOR REGIONS												
PARTY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	TOP UP SEATS	TOTAL SEATS
	APNU	1	-	1	4	1	-	1	-	-	2	16
AFC	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	5	7
PPP/C	1	2	2	3	1	2	1	-	1	-	19	32

Source: Guyana Elections Commission, December 1, 2011.

Beyond the individual-level realignments was the formation of A Partnership of National Unity (APNU), a coalition brought together two erstwhile political enemies: the PNC and the WPA. The WPA, cofounded in 1974 by the brilliant scholar Walter Rodney, had been a political thorn in the side of the Burnham government. Indeed, it was

²⁶Gillian Burton, former President of the Guyana Trades Union Congress, also endorsed the PPP/C. Further, the PPP/C also pulled off a coup in getting an endorsement from Shridath Ramphal, who had served as a PNC Attorney General and a Foreign Minister. Ramphal also served three terms as Commonwealth Secretary General. He led Guyana's team before the Guyana-Suriname maritime dispute arbitration, which in September 2007 awarded 85 percent of the disputed area to Guyana.

alleged that the PNC masterminded Rodney's death in June 1980, although the allegation was never substantiated. Interestingly, the PPP, which had joined the WPA and others in demanding an inquiry into the alleged assassination, declined to hold an inquiry after it won power in 1992. In June 2011 the PNC joined with the WPA, the Guyana Action Party, and the National Front Alliance to found APNU, hoping to displace the PPP/C. The PNC-WPA alliance validates the dictum that in politics there are no permanent allies or permanent enemies, just political interests.

Overall, the more significant surprises relate to the electoral outcomes. Although space limitations preclude elaboration it is important to mention three such surprises.

1. In spite of (a) having the benefit of numerous defections and endorsements, (b) outspending the opposing parties during the campaign, and (c) having the advantage of incumbency—to be addressed later—the PPP/C did not secure legislative control. While it won the presidency through a plurality, it lost legislative ground. As Table 1 shows, it won 32 National Assembly seats; in 2006 it had prevailed with 36 seats.
2. The PPP/C called for ballot recounts in several constituencies, including at 48 polling stations in Region 4 alone. (See Narine 2011) The APNU rejected the request vociferously, and the PPP/C recanted. Generally, opposing groups are the ones that seek recounts, not ruling parties. It seems the PPP/C panicked; it worried that it might be losing ground, despite having the competitive advantages mentioned above.
3. Despite the country's geography, it was surprising that, given the technology available and the apparent preparedness of the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) and the Secretariat, it took three days to get the official results. Thus, it was understandable that charges of ineptitude were leveled at the managers of the elections. Further, given the recount requests, there was plausible suspicion that irregularities were being orchestrated by the ruling party.

As suggested in item 1 above, the elections results are remarkable partly because the PPP/C had such a powerful incumbency advantage, which it used—and abused in some cases. Discussions of incumbency and elections require reflection on the use of patronage, influence, and threat **before** the elections, especially the preceding 60-90 days. The follow 10 items are noteworthy in the extant case.

1. Blatant PPP/C use of state media resources for campaigning. This issue assumes added significance when one considers the government's pre-elections record of press controls, punitive use of government advertising, and intimidation through threatened and actual lawsuits. The Commonwealth observers reported the following:

Breaches of the Media Code of Conduct were more explicit and were well documented by GECOM. For instance, the analysis [by the Media Monitoring Unit] indicated overt bias in state-owned media in favor of the government and ruling party. For instance, for October the Chronicle newspaper's news coverage provided 95% (neutral and positive) to the government and the ruling PPP/C; NCN TV provided 74% (neutral and positive) of its news coverage to the government and the PPP/C; and, Voice of Guyana Radio provided 88% (neutral and positive) of its news coverage to the government and the PPP/C. State-owned media was not alone in providing imbalanced reporting, and all media should pursue the highest standards of professionalism and independence. However, bias by the state media was more excessive. In addition, state-owned media has a higher moral responsibility to serve the interests of all citizens, particularly as in some parts of the country it is the only media available to citizens. (Observers 2011, 2-3)

2. Sept. 16: A Day of Appreciation for President Jagdeo; essentially a PPP/C campaign rally in disguise, for which state resources, including the security services, were used.
3. Oct. 21: The holding of the Investiture Ceremony to present national awards to 131 individuals and groups. (See Gildarie 2011) Interestingly, the Investiture Ceremony was started by the PNC in the 1970s. It was an annual event, held in May as part of independence commemoration. But it was suspended by the PPP/C after 2002, the last time before 2011 that it was held.
4. Nov. 4: The announcement of an 8% across-the-board salary increase for state employees, retroactive to January 1, 2011.
5. Nov. 7: Governor José de Anchieta Junior of the Brazilian state of Roraima appeared at a PPP/C campaign rally in Lethem, a town that borders Brazil.
6. Early Nov: Distribution of the first batch of 5,000 Chinese laptops, part of the One Laptop Per Family initiative.
7. Nov. 17: Promise of an end-of-year bonus for the security services during a "Thank You" tribute by the security services to Jagdeo for his Commander-in-Chief role.
8. Nov. 20: Sod-turning for the US\$51 Marriott Hotel in Georgetown, to be built by the Chinese by 2013.

9. Nov. 24: Declaration of Elections Day—November 28—as a national holiday.
10. State-funded foreign travel by PPP/C presidential hopeful Donald Ramotar. When Ramotar finally was declared the presidential candidate in April 2011 and he accompanied Jagdeo to New York, apparently on a campaign trip, there was a more boisterous outcry than before from the press and opposition parties. In response, Jagdeo named him a Presidential Advisor, thereby legitimizing his travel expenses.

Curiously enough, except for items 1, 2, 5, and 10, the ruling party was acting within the law. Yet, as we know, not everything that is lawful is necessarily fair, and not everything that is lawful may be politically expedient, especially during a time of political contestation. Moreover, there were credible reports of threats about the consequences of not supporting the PPP/C directed at state workers and some private companies with state contracts. Such is the advantage of incumbency, and fairness often is not a consideration. Depending on the beliefs of the incumbent **Political Keepers** and the degree of tolerance by the international community, political survival and expediency can trump the “free and fair” feature that is expected in healthy electoral democracies.

Undoubtedly, there were irregularities. Leaving aside claims by various opposition parties, the Organization of American States (OAS) observers noted that “The proportion of polling stations that were changed between the November 8th, 2011 published Official List of Polling Stations and the list provided to the OAS electoral observation mission dated November 25th was high. These discrepancies came to a national average of over 5 percent of polling stations, and were particularly elevated for stations located in Regions 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10.” (OAS Observers 2011) They also reported witnessing voters being unable to find their names on voting lists, and at least two instances at the official tabulation center where envelopes with Statements of Poll were delivered by unaccredited and unescorted individuals.

The irregularities were not egregious enough to nullify the results. But, when combined with the incumbency abuse noted above, they lead to the conclusion that the elections were not fair. Nevertheless, Guyana has a new President and **Political Keeper-in-Chief**, Donald Rabindranath Ramotar. As Commander-in-Chief, he also is **Security Keeper-in Chief**. Born on October 22, 1950, the 61-year-old leader has a Baccalaureate

degree in Economics from the University of Guyana. He has no executive governmental experience, but was a parliamentarian from 1992 until the elections. A life-long party apparatchik, he managed the party headquarters (Freedom House) between 1975 and 1983, served as International Secretary of the PPP-affiliated Guyana Agricultural Workers Union from 1988 to 1993, and succeeded Cheddi Jagan as PPP General Secretary in 1997, following Jagan's death.

Ramotar is not considered an inspirational speaker or leader. In fact, not only did Jagdeo seem to do more campaign speaking than he (partly, to defend his record), but some PPP/C supporters reportedly walked out of several campaign rallies when Ramotar spoke. So, Jagdeo likely will be a key member of the Ramotar Kitchen Cabinet, if not the *de facto* **Keeper-in-Chief** for a while. Ramotar's Cabinet, which was announced on December 5, 2011, reinforces this suspicion; 75 percent of the Cabinet is comprised of holdovers from Jagdeo's term, although most ministers have new portfolios. The need for continuity was given as the rationale for this.²⁷ Whatever the explanation, unless Ramotar clarifies boundaries and fixes his authority firmly and early, loyalty challenges could complicate his already tenuous plurality governance situation. The main electoral outcome—PPP/C control of the presidency but not the legislature—portends dangers (and opportunities) for Ramotar and Guyana; opportunities to bridge the racial divide and to take shared governance seriously. Thus, Ramotar's selection of an all-PPP/C Cabinet was a missed opportunity to build political bridges, although his agreement to consult the APNU and the AFC in preparing the national budget is a hopeful sign.

Governing with a legislative plurality, called a hung parliament scenario, makes compromise not just desirable, but necessary. Guyana faces the prospect of legislative gridlock with any PPP/C attempt to eschew compromise and practice "old politics." Additional dangers exist: (a) the drugs and crime entrepreneurs will exploit political wrangling, (b) foreign and security policy will be affected, not to mention domestic policy, and (c) internal security issues could command attention at the expense of

²⁷ For a list of the Cabinet ministers, see "Few New Faces in Ramotar Cabinet," *Stabroek News*, December 5, 2011, available at <http://www.stabroeknews.com/2011/news/stories/12/05/bishop-edghill-to-be-minister-in-ministry-of-finance/>. Some appointments are puzzling, such as Juan Edghill as Junior Minister of Finance, considering that he has no finance or related experience, and former Health Minister Leslie Ramsammy as the new Agriculture Minister. Also interesting is that Anil Nandlall, Jagdeo's personal attorney, is the new Attorney General. Moreover, his appointment breaks with a long tradition of having the Attorney General be a senior member of the legal fraternity, with the professional rank of Senior Counsel.

external national defense. Simply put, dangers loom large for Guyana if the PPP/C maintains its erstwhile values and beliefs about politics and power, with its premium on accentuating Indian-ness, practicing PPP/C paramountcy, and subordinating national interests to party political interests.

Thus, November 28, 2011 was not merely a date with electoral destiny for the contending political parties, but one with outcomes that set the stage for crisis, or opportunity, or both, for the nation. A key question is this: Is Ramotar able to rise above old PPP/C beliefs and dicta about politics and power and forge alliances that take Guyana forward? Put differently, will Ramotar and the other **Keepers** be able to take Guyana into a “new dawn” or keep it in “continued dusk?” Guyana’s situation calls to mind one of Thomas Jefferson’s notable assertions: “A politician looks forward only to the next election. A statesman looks forward to the next generation.” Time and outcomes over ensuing years will determine which label applies to Donald Ramotar and other **Keepers**.

Capabilities Landscape

The capabilities deficits—in manpower, equipment, training, and money—are such that the Guyana Defense Force (GDF), the Guyana Police Force (GPF), and other security services cannot adequately protect either state or society. This also applies to the government ministries, such as Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs. The GPF situation differs only by degree from that of other services. The GPF sounded the alarm thus:

The GPF has been short of its agreed establishment figure of 3,570 by some 7-800 officers for the last 10 years. This is 17%-18% below the agreed establishment needed to effectively provide the range of policing services sought by the citizens of Guyana and international communities. Lack of staff impacts heavily on training, effective deployment, and [it] leads to the over extension of staff. It means many officers perceive that they have disproportional work-loads, are unable to take leave and are vulnerable to make mistakes because they are covering a number of roles. For the GPF as an organization it means that relevant skill levels and aptitude for development are not always present and that having the right people doing the right thing at the right time becomes difficult to manage. (Guyana Police Force 2011, 14-15)

Obviously, the GPF is making a plea; *s’il vous plait, mon Dieu*. Thus, lamentations come not only from citizens but from parts of the state. The human capital deficits facing the GPF and other agencies are directly impacted by several factors. One

is the poor performance of the educational system at all levels. A second factor is the low wages and high cost of living (which conduce to corruption). Finally—and, perhaps, most significantly—is the massive emigration. The 2009 United Nations Development Program Human Development Report highlighted Guyana’s emigration rate of 33.5 percent. The Report cited two other factors that are worthy of note here: most emigrants go to North America and the Caribbean, and a significant number of them are University of Guyana graduates. It should be a cause of great concern to the **Political Elites** and the **Security Elites** that the departure rate of graduates is as high as 76.9 percent.

In addition, at a press conference in July 2010 the United States embassy in Georgetown reported that more than 20,000 immigrant visas had been issued to Guyanese between the beginning of 2006—which, coincidentally, was an elections year—and July 2010, as follows: 2006, 5,135 visa; 2007: 3,059 visas; 2008: 4,836 visas; 2009: 4,586 visas; up to July 2010: 2,624 visas. (*Kaieteur News* 2009; *The Daily Herald* 2010) **And this was legal migration, and only to the United States.** Guyanese have been moving legally and illegally in large numbers to Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia, Suriname, Canada, and elsewhere. Looking at the numbers is necessary, but it is not sufficient; it is crucial to see who leaves. Talented citizens are among those who leave in droves. This affects the nation’s security capabilities by depleting the pool of skills available to the army, police, courts, prisons, the Foreign Service, and other entities involved in articulating and executing security and foreign policies and programs.

Conclusion

This case study points to symmetries and asymmetries in the engagement of landscapes by leaders. In thinking about leaders leveraging landscapes it is important to recall the decades-old wisdom of the late, eminent scholar Kenneth Boulding: “The people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond [only] to the ‘objective’ facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their ‘image’ of the situation. It is what we think the world is like not what it is really like, that determines our behavior.” (Boulding 1969, 423) Indeed, in many cases perception is reality in so far leaders and decision-making are concerned. This applies to leaders and decision-making in large and powerful states as well as in small and subordinate ones, such as Guyana.

This study also confirms the wisdom of the epigraph suggestion about the utility of what I call the **local-global nexus approach** and of **agency**; of **symbolic and substantive engagement** by national elites in shaping both local actions and local-global outcomes. The age of interdependence in which we find ourselves suggests not just the *desirability* of embracing the **local-global nexus approach**, but the *necessity* to do so. As regards **agency**, I am reminded of the words of the short but trenchant poem, “You are Involved,” by Martin Carter, the late, distinguished Guyanese poet:

This I have learnt:
today a speck
tomorrow a hero
hero or monster
you are consumed!

Like a jig
shakes the loom.
Like a web
is spun the pattern
all are involved!
all are consumed!

This Findings Report also substantiates that small and subordinate societies, such as Guyana, are not devoid of complexities—of Origins, Keepers, and Challenges. Part of Guyana’s complexity has historical antecedents that still powerfully impact its contemporary polity and society. Competition by Old World states for New World territories in centuries past set the stage for Guyana’s enduring rivalries. And political interest articulation and aggregation have been influenced by the factor of race in ways that complicate the pursuit of sustained political order and continuous economic development. The November 2011 elections resulted in outcomes with the makings of both crisis and opportunity. Hopefully, with suitable assistance from the international community, the new Keepers will use the elections as a milestone to pursue opportunities to bridge the racial and political divides, and to provide the resources needed for adequate national defense and public security. In any case, I trust that this study piques the interest of readers to pay greater attention to the problems and promises of Guyana.

About the Author

Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Professor of Political Science and Provost and Senior Vice President at York College of The City University of New York, is an expert on Caribbean security and crime issues. He has been a visiting Scholar at the Royal Military College of Canada, the George Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany, and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, DC. Dr. Griffith also has been a consultant to Canada's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, USAID, and other entities. A member of the editorial board of *Security and Defense Studies Review*, he has testified before the United States Congress on Caribbean security issues.

Dr. Griffith has written and edited several books, including *Strategy and Security in the Caribbean* (Praeger 1991), *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean* (M.E. Sharpe, 1993), *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean* (Penn State Press 1997), and *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror* (Ian Randle Publishers 2004). He also has published more than 50 book chapters and articles in scholarly journals, including in *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, *Dickinson Journal of International Law*, *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, *University of Miami Law Review*, *International Journal*, *Latin American Research Review*, *The Round Table*, *Caribbean Quarterly*, *Naval War College Review*, *International Journal*, *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, *Joint Force Quarterly*, *Social and Economic Studies*, and *Security and Defense Studies Review*.

A past president of the Caribbean Studies Association, Dr. Griffith's recent work includes an entry in *The Encyclopedia of Drugs, Alcohol, and Addictive Behavior*, 3rd edition (2009), commentaries in the Inter-American Dialogue's *Latin American Advisor* (2010, 2011), and a June 2011 study on Suriname geopolitics, *The Re-Emergence of Suriname's Désiré (Desi) Bouterse: Political Acumen and Geopolitical Anxiety*. In October 2011 he delivered the 13th Annual Eric Williams Memorial Lecture at Florida International University, "Drugs and Crime as Problems without Passports in the Caribbean: How Secure is Security, and How Sovereign is Sovereignty?" The Lecture is available at http://casgroup.fiu.edu/events/docs/1630/1320244848_.pdf.

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